Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan won with resounding triumph at the polls on Sunday. Not only did he manage to win a majority of votes for a first round victory but through his alliance with the arch-nationalist party MHP, the National Movement Party, has also secured a parliamentary majority. He is, therefore, set to rule unencumbered for the next five years under an enhanced presidential system that reduces parliament to a rubber stamp.

These results could not have been better for  Erdogan. To be sure, his own Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost votes, down from 49 to 42 per cent and while this might be bothersome, it is largely inconsequential in the short-term.

Paradoxically, the success of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy Party (HDP) to cross the 10 per cent threshold and get into parliament despite AKP’s Herculean efforts to thwart its candidates – its leader Selahattin Demirtas, a presidential contender is in jail – by arresting poll-watchers, moving ballot boxes and the use of emergency law to prevent gatherings, will end up benefiting  Erdogan. He will be able to deflect all criticism – especially that coming from Europeans – of election manipulation and unfairness by pointing out that the Kurds did manage to get into parliament after all. Had the opposition won a majority in parliament then HDP’s presence would have significantly mattered, which is why  Erdogan used all the powers of the state apparatus to thwart them. The opposition is bound to be disillusioned; after all, the main opposition candidate Muharrem Ince, who was recruited to run by the CHP, the Republican People’s Party leadership, managed to inject a dose of excitement and dynamism rarely seen before into opposition ranks. The staid CHP leadership that routinely spews dull and outmoded ideas was replaced by a charismatic, energetic and quick-on-his-feet candidate whose rallies were filled with enthusiastic, full capacity crowds.  Ince’s performance convinced many observers that there would be a second presidential round between the two top contenders.

There are two factors the opposition in its enthusiasm overlooked. The first is the fact that for  Erdogan and his cronies, losing was never an option. They were ready to deploy – and they did – all the resources of the state and the media they controlled, which today amounts to about 90 per cent of print and television outlets. AKP introduced unprecedented loopholes into the electoral laws that eschewed the once unassailable fairness of the voting system. Like all other institutions, the electoral one is now under the control of the party.

Second, the AKP is a party that is in continuous electoral mobilisation mode. Its local apparatus is extremely effective, has direct knowledge about voters at the local level, can mobilise supporters, bring them to the polls and ensure high participation rates.

Only the HDP in Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish provinces is a match for the AKP. After 15 years in power, the AKP and the state have fused into one organism; economic growth, a system of rent distribution that first amply enriches cronies but also makes sure that supporters down the food chain also get a share, however small, has succeeded in attaching a significant segment of the population to the AKP. One can add to this an information system – one cannot call it a press anymore – that regurgitates the message from above 24/7. Not only does CHP have none of these attributes but it also has always had an aversion to politics at the retail level. This will have to change if it wants to be competitive in the future. Perhaps a brand new leadership that overhauls the party from top to bottom might succeed.

But with AKP ensconced, what can we now expect?  Erdogan is certainly emboldened. He will see this as a vindication of everything he has done and plans to do. He said as much in the first of his victory speeches. Turkey is now formally a personalised autocracy with all powers concentrated in the presidency. This was the plan all along; he did not build a gargantuan presidential palace because he envisioned luxurious accommodations but because he planned to run the whole country from one location. Space is needed for all of his advisers and others he will be appointing.

For the countries of the Arabian Gulf, an empowered  Erdogan spells trouble. He is intent on augmenting Turkey’s military and diplomatic footprint beyond his immediate neighbourhood, Iraq and Syria. He has already established a military base in Djibouti, deployed troops to Qatar and signed an agreement with Sudan.

The writer is a senior fellow for Middle East Studies in the Council

 on Foreign Relations