Iran’s presidential election is approaching. This will be the 12th presidential contest since 1979. The period for registration ended on April 15, and candidates will begin campaigning on April 28. The election itself will be held on May 19.
Several candidates appear to be both popular and controversial in Iran’s political establishment, including Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (mayor of Tehran), Ebrahim Raisi, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Hamid Baghaei and the incumbent Hassan Rouhani. Who will win?
Any scholar who has studied Iran for a long time knows that one of the issues that highlights the complexity of Iran’s political establishment and its elections is unpredictability. Like many who were mistakenly certain that Donald Trump would not become US president, many so-called Iran experts and policy analysts previously predicted that Ahmadinejad and Rouhani would never be president of Iran.
The unpredictability of political affairs and the outcome of the presidential elections partially comes from the contradictions in the instructions that the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, gives in private and in public.
In addition, the question of whether the overwhelming majority of Iran’s silent middle class will vote or not is a crucial factor. Previously, fraud in elections has also played a role in their outcome.
Nevertheless, there exists one certainty based on historical records. Since 1981, every Iranian president has been re-elected, and every president has served the maximum two consecutive terms permitted by the constitution.
While almost anyone is allowed to register for the presidential election, the candidates will have to go through a strict vetting process by the Guardian Council, a clerical body consisting of 12 members. The members of the council are directly or indirectly appointed by Khamenei. On April 28, the council will announce who is qualified to run.
Rouhani’s attempts to attract foreign investment on a large scale had not materialised. Khamenei rebuked Rouhani: "Attracting foreign investment is a positive measure but so far a very limited [number] of foreign contracts have materialised."
It is worth noting that Khamenei is resorting to his classic tactic of wielding power while avoiding being held accountable at any cost. To accomplish his objective, Khamenei has always made sure that his presidents take the responsibility for economic or political failure. In addition, he has ensured that the president doesn't wield any actual power. Rouhani did bring billions of dollars of extra revenues to Iran. But, the major reason that many people did not see the fruit of sanction reliefs or foreign contracts is that the beneficiaries of this additional cash were mostly the elite. Business deals were sealed at state level. The money did not trickle down to the people.
America’s seemingly changing policy towards Iran is also not helping Rouhani. Former US national security adviser, Michael Flynn, put Iran "on notice" after Iran test-fired a ballistic missile in apparent violation of a UN resolution. Iran argued that its ballistic missile is for defence purposes. Later, Iran testfired a pair of missiles and launched military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz, where one third of the global oil traded by sea passes through. Last week, US officials said that an Iranian frigate strayed dangerously close to a US navy ship.
Hardliners are capitalising on the heightened tensions between Iran and the US and hope to stop Rouhani from becoming president for another four years.
Most of Iran’s newspapers, which are owned by the hardliners, have also started a campaign to highlight Rouhani’s failures in domestic, foreign, and regional policies.
Although it seems that criticisms are raining down on Rouhani from almost every hardliner or institution, we should not jump to the conclusion that Rouhani has completely lost the blessing of the supreme leader. Khamenei is still desperately in need of the moderate camp’s diplomatic skills in case Iran and the West faced a perilous geopolitical or economic situation. The council makes sure that the candidates have been loyal to the revolutionary ideals of the Islamic Republic as well as the supreme leader.
If a candidate has shown any shred of defiance in the past, they will be disqualified from running for election even if the individual was the founding father of the Islamic Republic, such as the late Ali Akbar Rafsanjani who was disqualified in 2013. After the controversial 2009 elections which sparked popular protests, the Guardian Council became more strict in the approval process for a candidate. Even Iran’s religious reformists have little or no chance of passing the vetting procedure.
The writer is a leading Iranian-American political scientist and president of the International American Council
Some candidates, including women or religious and ethnic minorities, will be disqualified with no legitimate reason provided.
In other words, the candidates who get to run have the blessing and approval of the supreme leader and his inner circle.
Within this limited spectrum, there are several major political factions including the Popular Front of Islamic Revolution Forces, the Moderation and Development Party, The Front of Islamic Revolution Stability and The Reformists’ Policy Making Council.
It is also worth noting that many candidates run to rally support behind a particular faction. The elections will probably be contested by the Islamic hardliners, Rouhani’s moderates and the favourite candidate of the Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Although the IRGC is not allowed to meddle in the elections, it has always played a significant part. So far, its favourite candidate appears to be Raisi who was appointed by the supreme leader to be the chairman of a multi billion-dollar conglomerate.
For many Iranians, this election represents a choice between bad and worse. Rouhani still appears to have more popularity than the other candidates.
For Khamenei, either Rouhani or a hardline candidate (such as Raisi) will be good choices. Khamenei needs the moderates to enhance Iran’s legitimacy abroad, bring in revenue and use their shrewd diplomatic skills.
He also needs the hardliners to suppress opposition, more forcefully advance Iran’s regional ambitions and export Iran’s revolutionary ideals.
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Editor : M. Shamsur Rahman
Published by the Editor on behalf of Independent Publications Limited at Media Printers, 446/H, Tejgaon I/A, Dhaka-1215.
Editorial, News & Commercial Offices : Beximco Media Complex, 149-150 Tejgaon I/A, Dhaka-1208, Bangladesh. GPO Box No. 934, Dhaka-1000.
Editor : M. Shamsur Rahman
Published by the Editor on behalf of Independent Publications Limited at Media Printers, 446/H, Tejgaon I/A, Dhaka-1215.
Editorial, News & Commercial Offices : Beximco Media Complex, 149-150 Tejgaon I/A, Dhaka-1208, Bangladesh. GPO Box No. 934, Dhaka-1000.