What is the best way forward for Afghanistan?

Judging by recent statements I have heard from the United States, an American military surge in Afghanistan seems like a real possibility

First, a few words on the nature of conflict. It is a war between Afghanis who style themselves as freedom fighters against what they view as foreign invaders assisting a government they have installed.

This will not be a war of pitched battles, but of skirmishes, raids and ambushes. But wars are fought to be won, so what would constitute victory for the US?
In modern military campaigns, commanders define their maximum and minimum aims to achieve victory. In my opinion, the maximum aim would be to return Afghanistan to the state of a stable, secure country; and the minimum aim would be to return it to a state sufficiently secure and stable that the government can govern and its own agencies can maintain law and order. For years Helmand was the centrepiece of the western military intervention in Afghanistan, only for it to slip deeper into a quagmire of instability.
The Taliban effectively control or contest 10 of the 14 districts in Helmand, the deadliest province for British and US troops over the past decade and blighted by a huge opium harvest that helps fund the insurgency.
The Pentagon has said it would deploy some 300 US Marines this spring to Helmand, where American forces engaged in heated combat until they pulled out in 2014.
Separately on Thursday, a policeman linked to the Taliban killed nine of his colleagues as they were sleeping in the northern Kunduz province, local police chief Aziz Kamawal said.
Insider attacks – when Afghan soldiers and police turn their guns on their colleagues or international troops – have been a major problem during the more than 15-year-long war.
If that is so, how does the US get there? Since America’s military experience is on foreign soil, they are indifferent to the concept of "winning hearts and minds". Thus the use of the obscene term "collateral damage" for the innocent people they kill or maim.
If they have to achieve just the minimum aim, this time they have to win the hearts and minds of most Afghans.
Since they have spent the past decade and a half alienating the locals, this is a daunting task. The upside is that it’s still not impossible. The downside is that to try to succeed in this daunting task will result in increasing American casualties. The debate over troop numbers underscores concerns over the worsening security situation in Afghanistan, with insurgents threatening several provincial capitals amid anxiety that Pakistan, Russia and Iran were actively propping up the militants.
Aside from additional troops, local observers say the US war strategy in Afghanistan should include sustained pressure on Pakistan to stop harbouring insurgents.
"Nearly 16 years of war and billions of dollars could not bring peace and stability to war-torn Afghanistan," said Mia Gul Waseeq, a Kabul-based analyst. "How will a few more thousand troops bring sustainable peace in a way that more than 100,000 troops could not?"
Foremost here is the requirement of good governance. Since Kabul’s writ is confined to its immediate surroundings, this will require the use of force. But it will have to be temperate and selective.
The use of intelligence will need to be intensified. But the vastly superior electronic intelligence capabilities of the US are of limited value in identifying targets. To American eyes, all assemblies where Afghans are armed seem threatening and therefore suspicious. Sensible safety measures require offensive pre-emption of all such assemblies. If hearts and minds are to be won, this will have to change. If it is changed, there will be more US casualties.
Therefore there is a need for old-fashioned human intelligence which, over the years, the CIA has become less proficient at and has resorted to outsourcing. But this is also likely to fail. The few Afghans who will take the risk of becoming domestic pariahs are those already at the fringes of society. Others may be double agents.

The writer is a retired Pakistani army officer

What is the best way forward for Afghanistan?

Judging by recent statements I have heard from the United States, an American military surge in Afghanistan seems like a real possibility

First, a few words on the nature of conflict. It is a war between Afghanis who style themselves as freedom fighters against what they view as foreign invaders assisting a government they have installed. This will not be a war of pitched battles, but of skirmishes, raids and ambushes. But wars are fought to be won, so what would constitute victory for the US? In modern military campaigns, commanders define their maximum and minimum aims to achieve victory. In my opinion, the maximum aim would be to return Afghanistan to the state of a stable, secure country; and the minimum aim would be to return it to a state sufficiently secure and stable that the government can govern and its own agencies can maintain law and order. For years Helmand was the centrepiece of the western military intervention in Afghanistan, only for it to slip deeper into a quagmire of instability. The Taliban effectively control or contest 10 of the 14 districts in Helmand, the deadliest province for British and US troops over the past decade and blighted by a huge opium harvest that helps fund the insurgency. The Pentagon has said it would deploy some 300 US Marines this spring to Helmand, where American forces engaged in heated combat until they pulled out in 2014. Separately on Thursday, a policeman linked to the Taliban killed nine of his colleagues as they were sleeping in the northern Kunduz province, local police chief Aziz Kamawal said. Insider attacks when Afghan soldiers and police turn their guns on their colleagues or international troops have been a major problem during the more than 15-year-long war. If that is so, how does the US get there? Since Americas military experience is on foreign soil, they are indifferent to the concept of winning hearts and minds. Thus the use of the obscene term collateral damage for the innocent people they kill or maim. If they have to achieve just the minimum aim, this time they have to win the hearts and minds of most Afghans. Since they have spent the past decade and a half alienating the locals, this is a daunting task. The upside is that its still not impossible. The downside is that to try to succeed in this daunting task will result in increasing American casualties. The debate over troop numbers underscores concerns over the worsening security situation in Afghanistan, with insurgents threatening several provincial capitals amid anxiety that Pakistan, Russia and Iran were actively propping up the militants. Aside from additional troops, local observers say the US war strategy in Afghanistan should include sustained pressure on Pakistan to stop harbouring insurgents. Nearly 16 years of war and billions of dollars could not bring peace and stability to war-torn Afghanistan, said Mia Gul Waseeq, a Kabul-based analyst. How will a few more thousand troops bring sustainable peace in a way that more than 100,000 troops could not? Foremost here is the requirement of good governance. Since Kabuls writ is confined to its immediate surroundings, this will require the use of force. But it will have to be temperate and selective. The use of intelligence will need to be intensified. But the vastly superior electronic intelligence capabilities of the US are of limited value in identifying targets. To American eyes, all assemblies where Afghans are armed seem threatening and therefore suspicious. Sensible safety measures require offensive pre-emption of all such assemblies. If hearts and minds are to be won, this will have to change. If it is changed, there will be more US casualties. Therefore there is a need for old-fashioned human intelligence which, over the years, the CIA has become less proficient at and has resorted to outsourcing. But this is also likely to fail. The few Afghans who will take the risk of becoming domestic pariahs are those already at the fringes of society. Others may be double agents. The writer is a retired Pakistaniarmy officer