Russia is pivoting to Asia

FRED WEIR conflict over Ukraine is likely to continue to loom large when it comes to Russian foreign relations, especially as there seems no way – short of a third world war – that it is ever likely to relent on the main issue, its annexation of Crimea

It cannot be repeated often enough that Russia is a gargantuan country. Though its head and shoulders are in Europe, its enormous trunk occupies the entire northern sphere of Asia; at the eastern extreme its immediate neighbours are Japan, Korea and the US. In the far west the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad, nowadays an armed fortress, rubs shoulders with Sweden, Finland and several NATO countries. Across its sprawling southern frontier, Russia looks down upon the Balkans, the turbulent Middle East, the uneasy states of central Asia and shares a 3,000 mile border with China. In the far north it lays claim to the lion’s share of the fast-melting Arctic, stretching up to the North Pole, where its chief future competitors will be Canada, Norway and Denmark.

What is most surprising for foreigners is that, although Russia is a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional country, the majority ethnic Russian population across that vast expanse – from the Pacific to the Baltic – tends to be extremely homogeneous not only in tradition, culture and religion, but also in their political views and the ways in which they regard the outside world. Regional diversity, a major factor in the way some countries relate with the world, hardly applies at all to Russia.
To describe the foreign outlook and priorities of such a vast and multi-faced entity has never been easy to do without caricatures, but seems doubly difficult amid a fast-changing world in which long-standing certainties are evaporating, alliances are shifting and the very notion of global order is under attack.
Over the past 15 years the Russian government has published four different versions of its “foreign policy doctrine,” the most recent one signed into law by President Vladimir Putin just last December. They trace the evolution of Russian priorities from a transitional post-communist country eager to integrate with the West, especially the EU, to one that today feels burned by Western rejection, criticism and sanctions, and now sees its future in economic and political alliances in Asia, particularly with China.
Throughout its history, Russia has always nursed a sense of being a separate civilisation – superior to what it viewed as the morally lax and politically disorderly West – even as it hungered for the means of scientific, industrial and military superiority that were hallmarks of the West. That feeling reached a climax during the seven decades that the USSR attempted to build a full-scale alternative society that would be capable of outdoing the West in modern achievements. It failed spectacularly. Ironically, Russia today is more liberal and westernised than at any previous time, with a consumer economy and a constitution that differs little from that of France (though Russian implementation and political culture make for quite a different reality).
But Putin increasingly stresses Russia’s adherence to “traditional” values and has permitted the Russian Orthodox Church to wield more influence than it has since Czarist times. Russia has positioned itself as a bastion of social conservatism against what it views as the self-destructive liberalism of the West, criticising it on issues like same-sex marriage, the breakdown of the traditional family and the ongoing process of globalisation that dissolves borders and dilutes national identities. It’s hardly a comprehensive or challenging ideology, as Communism was, but the Kremlin talks about its current standoff with the West in terms of “duelling values.” It is also accused of seeking to forge political alliances with nationalists, anti-establishment populists and social conservatives in Europe and the US.
“Americans believe in their own exceptional role in the world, and that is rooted in the conviction that the US is the strongest country,” says Sergei Markov, a frequent adviser to Putin. “Russia has an anti-exceptional mood, based on our awareness that we are relatively weak and vulnerable from all sides. Hence, we favour a multi-polar world, in which national sovereignty is respected and all players are treated as equals.”
More ominously, the tone of Russia’s doctrine has shifted from a state that calculated relations with the outside world mostly in terms of trade, economic development and political cooperation, to one that now views the threat of international terrorism as paramount, and the possibility of regional wars around its periphery as something to actively prepare for. Russia is, in fact, in the midst of a $300 billion programme to replace 70% of its military hardware by 2020 with new generations of domestically-produced equipment, especially fighter planes, air defence systems, cruise missiles and tanks. Over the past decade a sweeping military reform has abolished the Soviet-era mass mobilisation army, reduced mandatory military service from three years to one, and created a spearhead of professional units – such as the “little green men” who swiftly and bloodlessly seized control of Crimea three years ago – which it intends to expand. The main, even urgent, concern is to develop rapid-deployment forces capable of intervening in Russia’s immediate region.
“While the danger of unleashing a large-scale war, including a nuclear conflict, remains low among leading states, there are increasing risks of their involvement in regional conflicts and the escalation of crises,” observes the latest version of the doctrine.
People in various corners of the world may regard Russia through the prism of their local anxieties and concerns, but the heavily-centralised and bureaucratised Russian state sees a broad and unified geopolitical picture, with Moscow at the centre. Its overriding concern is to preserve and extend Russia’s status, prestige and authority as a leading global power.
While there appears to be no appetite in Moscow today to return to a full-scale arms race with the US, or regain the former USSR’s network of satellite and client states, Russia does appear to be building up its role in new multi-national associations. These include the six-member Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which may well expand in the near future, the only such group of states that neither the US nor any of its allies belongs to. Russia’s foreign policy doctrine highlights its position as a permanent UN Security Council member, a remnant of its former superpower status. On issues like nuclear arms control and the civil war in Syria, Moscow seeks to engage the US as an equal negotiating partner, just as the Soviet Union would have done. 
    The Wire

Russia is pivoting to Asia

FRED WEIR conflict over Ukraine is likely to continue to loom large when it comes to Russian foreign relations, especially as there seems no way – short of a third world war – that it is ever likely to relent on the main issue, its annexation of Crimea

It cannot be repeated often enough that Russia is a gargantuan country. Though its head and shoulders are in Europe, its enormous trunk occupies the entire northern sphere of Asia; at the eastern extreme its immediate neighbours are Japan, Korea and the US. In the far west the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad, nowadays an armed fortress, rubs shoulders with Sweden, Finland and several NATO countries. Across its sprawling southern frontier, Russia looks down upon the Balkans, the turbulent Middle East, the uneasy states of central Asia and shares a 3,000 mile border with China. In the far north it lays claim to the lions share of the fast-melting Arctic, stretching up to the North Pole, where its chief future competitors will be Canada, Norway and Denmark. What is most surprising for foreigners is that, although Russia is a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional country, the majority ethnic Russian population across that vast expanse from the Pacific to the Baltic tends to be extremely homogeneous not only in tradition, culture and religion, but also in their political views and the ways in which they regard the outside world. Regional diversity, a major factor in the way some countries relate with the world, hardly applies at all to Russia. To describe the foreign outlook and priorities of such a vast and multi-faced entity has never been easy to do without caricatures, but seems doubly difficult amid a fast-changing world in which long-standing certainties are evaporating, alliances are shifting and the very notion of global order is under attack. Over the past 15 years the Russian government has published four different versions of its foreign policy doctrine, the most recent one signed into law by President Vladimir Putin just last December. They trace the evolution of Russian priorities from a transitional post-communist country eager to integrate with the West, especially the EU, to one that today feels burned by Western rejection, criticism and sanctions, and now sees its future in economic and political alliances in Asia, particularly with China. Throughout its history, Russia has always nursed a sense of being a separate civilisation superior to what it viewed as the morally lax and politically disorderly West even as it hungered for the means of scientific, industrial and military superiority that were hallmarks of the West. That feeling reached a climax during the seven decades that the USSR attempted to build a full-scale alternative society that would be capable of outdoing the West in modern achievements. It failed spectacularly. Ironically, Russia today is more liberal and westernised than at any previous time, with a consumer economy and a constitution that differs little from that of France (though Russian implementation and political culture make for quite a different reality). But Putin increasingly stresses Russias adherence to traditional values and has permitted the Russian Orthodox Church to wield more influence than it has since Czarist times. Russia has positioned itself as a bastion of social conservatism against what it views as the self-destructive liberalism of the West, criticising it on issues like same-sex marriage, the breakdown of the traditional family and the ongoing process of globalisation that dissolves borders and dilutes national identities. Its hardly a comprehensive or challenging ideology, as Communism was, but the Kremlin talks about its current standoff with the West in terms of duelling values. It is also accused of seeking to forge political alliances with nationalists, anti-establishment populists and social conservatives in Europe and the US. Americans believe in their own exceptional role in the world, and that is rooted in the conviction that the US is the strongest country, says Sergei Markov, a frequent adviser to Putin. Russia has an anti-exceptional mood, based on our awareness that we are relatively weak and vulnerable from all sides. Hence, we favour a multi-polar world, in which national sovereignty is respected and all players are treated as equals. More ominously, the tone of Russias doctrine has shifted from a state that calculated relations with the outside world mostly in terms of trade, economic development and political cooperation, to one that now views the threat of international terrorism as paramount, and the possibility of regional wars around its periphery as something to actively prepare for. Russia is, in fact, in the midst of a $300 billion programme to replace 70% of its military hardware by 2020 with new generations of domestically-produced equipment, especially fighter planes, air defence systems, cruise missiles and tanks. Over the past decade a sweeping military reform has abolished the Soviet-era mass mobilisation army, reduced mandatory military service from three years to one, and created a spearhead of professional units such as the little green men who swiftly and bloodlessly seized control of Crimea three years ago which it intends to expand. The main, even urgent, concern is to develop rapid-deployment forces capable of intervening in Russias immediate region. While the danger of unleashing a large-scale war, including a nuclear conflict, remains low among leading states, there are increasing risks of their involvement in regional conflicts and the escalation of crises, observes the latest version of the doctrine. People in various corners of the world may regard Russia through the prism of their local anxieties and concerns, but the heavily-centralised and bureaucratised Russian state sees a broad and unified geopolitical picture, with Moscow at the centre. Its overriding concern is to preserve and extend Russias status, prestige and authority as a leading global power. While there appears to be no appetite in Moscow today to return to a full-scale arms race with the US, or regain the former USSRs network of satellite and client states, Russia does appear to be building up its role in new multi-national associations. These include the six-member Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which may well expand in the near future, the only such group of states that neither the US nor any of its allies belongs to. Russias foreign policy doctrine highlights its position as a permanent UN Security Council member, a remnant of its former superpower status. On issues like nuclear arms control and the civil war in Syria, Moscow seeks to engage the US as an equal negotiating partner, just as the Soviet Union would have done. The Wire