Evolving dynamics in Middle East and North Africa
Under Trump, the United States might adapt its strategy in Syria, favoring one that more selectively aids specific groups in the fight against the Islamic State rather than those fighting the Assad government
Muhammad Zamir
Analysts and common citizens of the world are paying greater attention on what emanates from the White House or the Trump Tower- now that Donald Trump is the new President of the United States. There will be speculation on every aspect of different issues that feature prominently on the international agenda. Particular interest will be with regard to the unfolding dynamics within the Middle East and North Africa.
Consequently, it will be appropriate of me to make a fresh assessment of the scenario that in all probability will unfold in the context of Syria, Turkey, US-Iran relations, the Gulf and in some areas of North Africa. It would also be fitting to refer to the common effort in fighting ISIS.
Despite controversial comments made during the US election process by different contenders, it is certain that the United States will continue to be engaged with the Middle East in 2017 as it was during in 2016. However, it will, in all probability be more judicious in its engagement and will give other countries a more active participatory role in the effort to find solutions to problems. This, in all likelihood, will play out primarily in and around the Syria-Iraq battlefield, an equation which continues to affect the neighbors, intensify the ongoing rivalry between Turkey and Iran, and heighten sectarian tensions and the security paradigm of the region.
One needs to start with Syria. Many might be thinking, especially after the joint effort being taken by Russia and Turkey that the Syrian civil war will end in 2017. Some are also pointing towards the fact that the forces loyal to Bashar al Assad have not only retaken the critical city of Aleppo but also now control a few major cities and have the luxury of consolidating the gains they have made. All of this is true but it still looks unlikely that the conflict will end in 2017. The loyalists associated with Assad are putting up a good fight but it is unlikely that they will be able to finish the civil war. They are simply being pulled in too many directions to achieve a decisive victory. In addition to holding their territory in the north, they must now try to also clear the rebels located between Aleppo and Damascus and around Damascus itself. They will also be drawn to areas held by the Islamic State in the eastern city of Deir el-Zour, where other loyalists are currently besieged. Retaking territory in the energy belt around Palmyra will also have to be a priority too. Consequently, there is still a lot work left for them to do, and any number of things can shift the balance of power in such a conflict-ridden country.
These constraints facing the loyalists will continue to be further complicated, as in the past, through the presence of foreign powers in the region.
Under Trump, the United States might adapt its strategy in Syria, favoring one that more selectively aids specific groups in the fight against the Islamic State rather than those fighting the al Assad government. Washington will, for example, be expected to continue its backing of the Kurdish forces but will curb support for rebels in Idlib. There will then be several consequences- first, Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia will have to increase their support for the rebels, including the more radical ones, the United States has forsaken; second, their support will give radical elements room to thrive, as will the reduced oversight associated with Washingtons disengagement and third, Russia will be able to cooperate more tactically with the United States and its allies as it tries to exact concessions, including the easing of sanctions, in a broader negotiation with Washington. In this regard, one could expect that Russia will cooperate insofar as it helps Moscow achieve its partisan goals. Nevertheless, given Putins desire to emerge as a strongman in the region, it might encourage Russia to carry on its efforts to replace Washington as the primary arbiter of Syrian negotiation.
It would also be safe to assume that while other powers are preoccupied with the fight against the Islamic State, Turkey will expand its sphere of influence in northern Syria and Iraq, driven as it is by its imperative to block Kurdish expansion. In Syria, the presence of Russian troops will probably prevent Turkey from venturing any farther south than al Bab in northern Aleppo, but, it is expected that Turkey will try to drive eastward toward the town of Manbij to divide and thus weaken areas held by the Kurds. Turkey will also certainly lobby for a bigger role in anti-Islamic State operations in Raqqa and in this regard be willing to deploy more of its own forces in the Syrian fight, both to obstruct the expansion of Syrian Kurdish forces and also to degrade the Islamic State. To avoid complications however, Turkey will have to carefully manage tensions with the United States over Washingtons continued support for the Kurds. Turkey will also try to extend its influence in the north notably, to where the Ottoman Empires border was once drawn through Sinjar, Mosul, Arbil and Kirkuk. This will of course also mean competing with Iran for influence in the power vacuum left by the Islamic States defeat in Mosul. It needs to be understood here that efforts pertaining to Turkeys resurgence might be interpreted by Iran as threatening Irans arc of influence across northern Syria and Iraq. This could persuade Tehran to encourage Shiites in Baghdad to resist such Turkish moves. The eventual fall of Mosul, in all probability will further divide Iraqs Kurds. There will then be an inevitable scramble for territory and influence. This will pit the Turkey-backed Kurdistan Democratic Party against the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which is more closely allied with Iran. Kirkuk, a city and province awash in oil, will be particularly contentious. The KDP will try to keep what it has gained there, while Baghdad, backed by Iran, will try to take it back. This will impede sustainable cooperation in energy production and revenue sharing operations between Baghdad and Iraqi Kurdistan.
At this point one needs to turn to Iran and prospective durability of US-Iranian relations during this year. Observations by several members of Trumps team suggest that the new U.S. government might be less tolerant of Iranian actions like naval harassment and ballistic missile testing (even if it does not directly infringe on the nuclear deal). Analysts have observed that it is unlikely that the Trump Administration will completely dismantle the nuclear agreement but Trump is likely to take a hard re-examination of its facets. It needs to be noted here that deterioration in US-Iran relations would only benefit Russia. It will then tighten its relationship with Iran through economic and military deals. It needs to be also remembered here that Iran is currently trying its best to boost its economy, something it will not be able to do without the foreign trade, investment and interaction the nuclear deal allows. This is important because the Iranian economy, in fact, will be the determining factor in its Presidential election, scheduled to take place in May. It may be noted here that President Hassan Rouhani, a moderate by Irans standards, has already been using the partial removal of sanctions and the stabilization of the inflation rate factor as positive moves that is benefitting ordinary Iranians and reducing anti-US sentiment among the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Nevertheless, regardless of the elections outcome, Iran will remain under the influence of conservative politicians who are beholden to the supreme leader, who distrusts the United States but also understands the need to re-enter the global economy.
Saudi Arabia is expected to follow developments in U.S.-Iran relations very carefully in view of its regional proxy battles with Iran. The rest of this year should see Saudi Arabia trying to reduce its budget deficit and move forward towards translation of its ambitious Vision 2030 and Vision 2020 plans. Saudi citizens in all likelihood will continue to clamor for change as the drive toward reform presses on, but the government will prioritize the economy over social reform, partially because social reform risks alienating the Saudi religious establishment. Saudi Arabia will also struggle to steer Yemen toward a negotiated settlement while the United Arab Emirates firms up its position in southern Yemen. Saudi Arabia will also continue to give its allies in North Africa- Egypt and Morocco, economic and security support in exchange for their support of its foreign policy in places like Yemen and Syria. In addition, the United Arab Emirates is expected to lead a Gulf-wide initiative and put technical preparations in place to set up a standard value-added tax levied at 5 percent. The initiative is slated to kick off in early 2018.
Egypt will remain involved in Libya because Egyptian and Emirati support for nationalist Gen. Khalifa Hifter, who commands the Libyan National Army, is beginning to pay off. It looks likely that Hifter will be able to strengthen his military and political control in eastern Libya and will then try to expand his control into Western Libya. This might not however be entirely possible. Regardless, Hifters divisiveness is bound to impede U.N.-led negotiations to form and approve a unity government. This means that Libya will continue to be a battle space among rival militias that will limit the potential for a lasting peace deal in 2017. This will be so because whoever wins this competition will win Libyas oil wealth.
Latest developments have indicated that ISIS is losing power not only in Syria and Iraq but also in Libya. It appears to have been degraded from being a group with conventional military force capability to being a terrorist or insurgent force. Dispersed throughout the areas they once controlled, remnants of the Islamic State will during this year remain relevant by exploiting ethnic and sectarian divisions throughout Iraq and Syria. It needs to be also pointed out that while the Islamic State has been commanding the attention of the international community, al Qaeda has also been quietly rebuilding itself. They have been restyling themselves under various names in Libya, Algeria, Mali, Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen. They will, in all likelihood be more active and influential.
No review of the evolving situation in the Middle East can be complete without reference to Israel and Palestine. 2017 will present Israel with a variety of opportunities, the biggest of which will come from its security guarantor, the United States. With Republicans firmly in control of the executive and legislative branches of government in the U.S., Israel will have freer rein to pursue its interests without rebuke. The country will benefit from a more assertive U.S. policy on Iran. An emboldened Israel, despite recent observations in the United Nations Security Council and the Conference in Paris in the third week of January will probably accelerate settlement development in the West Bank, even if doing so incites attacks from Palestinian militants. An escalation in Israeli-Palestinian frictions will then stress Israels relationships with Jordan and Egypt, both facing internal stresses of their own.
However this year is likely to also present Israel with another growing challenge- that of a resurgent Hezbollah, more powerful and experienced than it has been in years thanks to its heavy participation in the Syrian civil war. This prospect might encourage Israel, unencumbered by Washingtons reproach, to intensify its operations in Syria and Lebanon in an attempt to weaken Hezbollah and limit their access to advanced weaponry.
It will be a complex scenario, worth watching with caution. It will also cast a long shadow on the rest of the world- including Bangladesh. Among other things, a volatile Middle East will reduce the chance of expatriates being associated with their economic development projects.
Muhammad Zamir, a former ambassador, is an analyst specialised in foreign affairs,right to information and goodgovernance. He can be reached at [email protected]
