The biggest fault line potentially facing the incoming Trump administration in the United States has become clear: relations with Russia. On no other issue is president-elect Donald Trump so isolated or baffling.
During the campaign he repeatedly expressed inexplicable admiration for Russian president Vladimir Putin, and this has only intensified since. Trump has issued many statements praising Putin's intelligence and leadership in almost obsequious and servile language that seems completely disconnected from any identifiable policy goal and totally incommensurate with the relative power of the two countries.
With a proper sense of perspective, it is clear that none of these events – Brexit, Trump, the election of Rodrigo Duterte in The Philippines and the rise of populists in many countries – have been disasters. Disturbing to many, clearly, but not cataclysmic by any means.
Given that it led to the invasion of Iraq, one could say that the election of George W Bush was a disaster. If, as has been recently alleged, evidence has been found that proves president Richard Nixon interfered with the peace negotiations that could have ended the Vietnam War under Lyndon Johnson, that was not just a disaster but a crime.
And three events of a century ago – the Russian Revolution, the end of US isolationism with its entry into the First World War and the issuance of the Balfour Declaration – were far more world-shaking than anything that happened last year. They truly had consequences of an order that could lead to them being described as disastrous, should one view them negatively.
But today, questions are being asked as to whether democracy itself is in trouble. Could we be entering an era of "democratic deconsolidation", as an essay in the January issue of the Journal of Democracy suggests? The trend "across most liberal democracies is a very serious warning sign", write the authors, Roberto Foa and Yascha Mounk.
But there has been nothing undemocratic about the elections of last year. No one seriously challenges the validity of the results in Britain, America, the Philippines, or indeed Austria, where a far-right candidate came close to winning the presidency.
A fringe of Americans on the far left, nostalgic for the old Soviet Union, and the far right, who have constructed a ludicrous fantasy version of Putin as the champion of white supremacy and Christian traditionalism in a globalising and multicultural world, openly admire the Russian autocrat. But the overwhelming majority of Democrats and Republicans, foreign policy experts on both the left and the right, and ordinary Americans, recognise that Putin’s Russia is not only not a plausible ally to the United States, it is by far its most dangerous adversary.
There are many theories, all unsatisfactory and unconvincing, seeking to explain Trump’s bizarre infatuation with Putin.
The most rational is that Trump seeks to enact a "reverse Nixon" policy, aligning with Russia against China. Yet Russia still poses a far greater challenge to most American foreign policies than China. And China has every reason to ultimately support the stability and economy of its biggest export market, the United States. Moreover, none of that would explain Trump’s grovelling comments.
Some speculate, entirely without evidence, that Trump may owe large financial debts to Russia or is being blackmailed in some way by the Kremlin. Another view holds that he admires and seeks to emulate Putin’s autocratic style, which again wouldn’t explain his tone.
Others insist that Trump has joined white supremacists in casting Putin as the champion of a global white, Christian community threatened by racial, ethnic and religious others. Despite his campaign shenanigans, it’s unlikely Trump really believes that.
There is, as yet, no plausible explanation for Trump’s pro-Moscow attitudes, let alone his fawning. Nevertheless, the prospect of a pro-Russian turn has been greatly intensified by his nomination for secretary of state of Rex Tillerson, the Exxon Mobil chief executive and one of Putin’s closest American friends.
Senior senate Republicans including John McCain and Lindsey Graham, most Democrats and the foreign policy establishment will reject any effort to subordinate, or even strongly align, American foreign policy with Russia’s. Even the American public fully understands that Moscow is not Washington’s friend.
The consensus regarding the Russian threat, which Trump alone dismisses (albeit with increasing difficulty), significantly sharpened last week with an uprorar over additional confirmation of Russian efforts to influence the American election by hacking into Democratic, and probably Republican, party emails and selectively releasing them to advantage Trump.
Washington’s relationship with Moscow is crucial for the Middle East because any tilt towards Russia could significantly alter the American role in the region, particularly regarding the conflict in Syria and, ultimately, a range of issues involving Moscow’s close ally, Iran.
The writer is a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington
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Editor : M. Shamsur Rahman
Published by the Editor on behalf of Independent Publications Limited at Media Printers, 446/H, Tejgaon I/A, Dhaka-1215.
Editorial, News & Commercial Offices : Beximco Media Complex, 149-150 Tejgaon I/A, Dhaka-1208, Bangladesh. GPO Box No. 934, Dhaka-1000.
Editor : M. Shamsur Rahman
Published by the Editor on behalf of Independent Publications Limited at Media Printers, 446/H, Tejgaon I/A, Dhaka-1215.
Editorial, News & Commercial Offices : Beximco Media Complex, 149-150 Tejgaon I/A, Dhaka-1208, Bangladesh. GPO Box No. 934, Dhaka-1000.