Ankara can no longer afford to ignore how the region has changed

Rapprochement with Israel risks undermining Turkey’s support of the Palestinian cause. Closer ties with Iran risks angering Saudi Arabia

Turkey has made great strides in implementing a comprehensive foreign-policy shift outlined by prime minister Binali Yildirim in May 2016. "Turkey has a lot of problems. We have regional problems," he said at the time. "So what will we do? Very simple: We’ll increase the number of our friends and we’ll decrease the number of our enemies."

He elaborated further in July: "It is our greatest and irrevocable goal: developing good relations with Syria and Iraq, and all our neighbours that surround the Mediterranean and the Black Sea."
Turkey has since patched things up with Israel, improved ties with Iran, expressed an interest in mending fences with Egypt, softened its rhetoric against the Syrian regime, and normalised relations with Russia at lightning speed, resulting in Ankara and Moscow now taking ownership of diplomacy over Syria. Meanwhile, ties with the United States, which became increasingly strained under president Barack Obama, will probably be reset when Donald Trump is inaugurated on January 20.
This process is widely seen as a reincarnation of Turkey’s regional policy in the 2000s, described by Ahmet Davutoglu – a former prime minister, foreign minister and chief adviser to president Recep Tayyip Erdogan – as "zero problems with neighbours". 
This policy is interpreted as having been undone by Ankara’s strident positions after the Arab Spring, particularly its vehement opposition to the Syrian regime and to the toppling of former Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi. 
However, this widely accepted narrative of Turkey’s regional status – past and present – is overly simplistic and mischaracterises its position and the dynamics of the Middle East. It is woefully naive to think that Turkey could have maintained, let alone achieved, "zero problems with neighbours" in such a turbulent and polarised region. This does not even exist in stable regions. Lest we forget, the Middle East was no oasis of peace, stability and unity before the Arab Spring. The wide-ranging and devastating fallout from the invasion and occupation of Iraq is the most obvious example, but not the only one. The Arab Spring did not create problems – it brought long-festering ones out into the open.
It is not "very simple" – on the contrary, in fact – to have "good" relations with "all" countries surrounding the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, which cover such vast and complex regions as the Middle East, North Africa, southern and Eastern Europe, and the Caucuses. 
These foreign-policy goals are as utopian as they are unrealistic. Yes, Ankara has done much in the past several months to mend fences, but this is not without risks and costs. In the Middle East, making a friend often entails losing another. 
Rapprochement with Israel risks undermining Turkey’s support of the Palestinian cause. Closer ties with Iran risks angering Saudi Arabia. Rapprochement with Russia risks upsetting the Syrian opposition. Mending fences with Egypt would risk alienating Qatar. Because these various overtures are recent, there has been insufficient time for the repercussions to fully develop, let alone be assessed. 
For example, while the governments of Turkey’s Gulf allies have been muted about its shifting positions vis-à-vis Russia, Iran and the Syrian regime, considerable unease is being expressed by Gulf commentators who echo, or are privy to, official sentiment. More broadly, there is alarm about what many in the region and beyond see as Ankara’s abandonment of the Syrian revolution.
Similarly, while neither the Palestinian Authority nor its main domestic rival Hamas have criticised Turkey’s rapprochement with Israel, Palestinians across the political spectrum view it as a betrayal. They are particularly mindful of Mr Erdogan’s repeated insistence that there would be no such rapprochement unless Israel lifted its blockade of Gaza. Ankara and Tel Aviv have normalised ties, yet Gaza remains under siege.
The widely accepted basis for Turkey’s foreign-policy shifts – its desire to end its regional isolation – is oversimplified and exaggerated. No country in the Middle East has managed to achieve what Ankara aspires to: good relations with everyone. When looking at the region’s deep fissures, other countries are also experiencing varying degrees of isolation – this is typical of divided regions, so Turkey is no exception. 

The writer is a journalist and analyst on Arab affairs

Ankara can no longer afford to ignore how the region has changed

Rapprochement with Israel risks undermining Turkeys support of the Palestinian cause. Closer ties with Iran risks angering Saudi Arabia

Turkey has made great strides in implementing a comprehensive foreign-policy shift outlined by prime minister Binali Yildirim in May 2016. Turkey has a lot of problems. We have regional problems, he said at the time. So what will we do? Very simple: Well increase the number of our friends and well decrease the number of our enemies. He elaborated further in July: It is our greatest and irrevocable goal: developing good relations with Syria and Iraq, and all our neighbours that surround the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Turkey has since patched things up with Israel, improved ties with Iran, expressed an interest in mending fences with Egypt, softened its rhetoric against the Syrian regime, and normalised relations with Russia at lightning speed, resulting in Ankara and Moscow now taking ownership of diplomacy over Syria. Meanwhile, ties with the United States, which became increasingly strained under president Barack Obama, will probably be reset when Donald Trump is inaugurated on January 20. This process is widely seen as a reincarnation of Turkeys regional policy in the 2000s, described by Ahmet Davutoglu a former prime minister, foreign minister and chief adviser to president Recep Tayyip Erdogan as zero problems with neighbours. This policy is interpreted as having been undone by Ankaras strident positions after the Arab Spring, particularly its vehement opposition to the Syrian regime and to the toppling of former Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi. However, this widely accepted narrative of Turkeys regional status past and present is overly simplistic and mischaracterises its position and the dynamics of the Middle East. It is woefully naive to think that Turkey could have maintained, let alone achieved, zero problems with neighbours in such a turbulent and polarised region. This does not even exist in stable regions. Lest we forget, the Middle East was no oasis of peace, stability and unity before the Arab Spring. The wide-ranging and devastating fallout from the invasion and occupation of Iraq is the most obvious example, but not the only one. The Arab Spring did not create problems it brought long-festering ones out into the open. It is not very simple on the contrary, in fact to have good relations with all countries surrounding the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, which cover such vast and complex regions as the Middle East, North Africa, southern and Eastern Europe, and the Caucuses. These foreign-policy goals are as utopian as they are unrealistic. Yes, Ankara has done much in the past several months to mend fences, but this is not without risks and costs. In the Middle East, making a friend often entails losing another. Rapprochement with Israel risks undermining Turkeys support of the Palestinian cause. Closer ties with Iran risks angering Saudi Arabia. Rapprochement with Russia risks upsetting the Syrian opposition. Mending fences with Egypt would risk alienating Qatar. Because these various overtures are recent, there has been insufficient time for the repercussions to fully develop, let alone be assessed. For example, while the governments of Turkeys Gulf allies have been muted about its shifting positions vis--vis Russia, Iran and the Syrian regime, considerable unease is being expressed by Gulf commentators who echo, or are privy to, official sentiment. More broadly, there is alarm about what many in the region and beyond see as Ankaras abandonment of the Syrian revolution. Similarly, while neither the Palestinian Authority nor its main domestic rival Hamas have criticised Turkeys rapprochement with Israel, Palestinians across the political spectrum view it as a betrayal. They are particularly mindful of Mr Erdogans repeated insistence that there would be no such rapprochement unless Israel lifted its blockade of Gaza. Ankara and Tel Aviv have normalised ties, yet Gaza remains under siege. The widely accepted basis for Turkeys foreign-policy shifts its desire to end its regional isolation is oversimplified and exaggerated. No country in the Middle East has managed to achieve what Ankara aspires to: good relations with everyone. When looking at the regions deep fissures, other countries are also experiencing varying degrees of isolation this is typical of divided regions, so Turkey is no exception. The writer is a journalist and analyston Arab affairs