Does Erdogan wish to become Caliph?

His progressive Islamization programme for Turkey suffered a blow that is perhaps irreversible. It is a programme that has been followed without hesitation and, for a long time, has also enjoyed the short-sighted support of the European Union

The sudden entry into the war against Islamic State seems to be a revolution for Turkey’s foreign policy, but the president’s objectives remain unchanged.

There is a character in French comic books, the Grand Vizier Iznogud (a name that says it all) who spends his life scheming in vain to “become caliph in the place of the caliph.”
This is the destiny that appears to await Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan following the unexpected electoral success of the Kurdish HDP that removed his absolute majority for the first time since his Justice and Freedom (AKP) party entered the Turkish political scene, and with it the possibility of forming a one-party government.
His progressive Islamization programme for Turkey suffered a blow that is perhaps irreversible. It is a programme that has been followed without hesitation and, for a long time, has also enjoyed the short-sighted support of the European Union.
In its desire to reduce militarism in a country that has been negotiating membership, the EU has conscientiously supported all measures aimed at removing power from the very armed forces to which Ataturk’s constitutional legacy entrusted control and the ultimate defence of the nation’s secular nature. Occasionally, Brussels even encouraged these measures, accelerating a perhaps inevitable process, but one that achieved what was probably undeserved respectability from Brussels.
Erdoğan’s electoral setback also appears to be affecting the complex web of foreign policy that Turkey is currently weaving. Ankara is operating with a Realpolitik that, in many cases, goes well beyond the limits of traditional morality. In plain language, what he would like is that the acts of a country be guided by values beyond its interests and rejecting the Machiavellian approach stating that “the end always justifies the means.”
Who is the spider at the centre of the Turkish web is a subject frequently discussed. Previously this role was unhesitatingly assigned to Erdogan. His foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, was seen as the ideologue of reference.
It was the classic duo of men of power; one had the strategic vision and the other was able to turn that vision into reality. Then, apparently, the two paths separated as both men developed politically and their roles changed, with Erdogan becoming president and Davutoglu becoming prime minister. There is now often talk of disagreements between the two and the possibility of them opposing one another. Is the disagreement between the two real? Or are we seeing yet another version of the drama of the two policemen, with Davutoglu playing the good cop and Erdogan, obviously, the bad one?
All this is taking place as the country is trying to establish itself as a regional power, recovering at least some of the Ottoman Empire’s prestige and area of influence, while two wars are being fought within the Islamic universe, neither declared, but no less serious, in which Turkey is one of the major participants and while tensions between Ankara and the Kurds are about to become an open civil war. Very difficult conditions 
indeed.
It is perhaps for this reason that Erdogan and Turkey appear to be following, contemporaneously, two diverging strategic paths in the short term that will converge in the long term, and even perhaps in the medium term.
The first is the most obvious strategy, which centres around the image of a nation that must remain as pure, as pro-Western and as pro-NATO as possible. This was seen in the recent concessions made in Cyprus, where apparently, for the first time, there was serious talk of removing the wall that separates the two communities. Then came the concession for the use of the U.S. air base at Incirlick for use by the anti-Islamic State coalition, which had been previously, obstinately, denied. Then came the idea of establishing a buffer zone in Syria, allowing hundreds of thousands of refugees to escape the dangers of war. And finally, the announcement of intervention against the “Caliphate”, with little attention given to the fact that this is limited to firing an occasional artillery round, while the real action is aimed at Kurds belonging to the PKK, definitely burying the truce in force since 2013.
The second strategy is hidden and, as such, revealed in all its aspects only to a few in power. In analyzing it, we are venturing into the field of hypotheses, not certainties, with all the randomness of judgement that that entails.
If we concentrate our reasoning on cui prodest? , it immediately becomes clear how the actions of Islamic State benefit, in no uncertain terms, the Sunnis, who are involved in an undeclared war without quarter against the Shia. This conflict will decide which of the two sides will prevail in the Islamic universe and will define more or less definite borders between the two opposing religious confessions.

    Republica

 

Does Erdogan wish to become Caliph?

His progressive Islamization programme for Turkey suffered a blow that is perhaps irreversible. It is a programme that has been followed without hesitation and, for a long time, has also enjoyed the short-sighted support of the European Union

The sudden entry into the war against Islamic State seems to be a revolution for Turkeys foreign policy, but the presidents objectives remain unchanged. There is a character in French comic books, the Grand Vizier Iznogud (a name that says it all) who spends his life scheming in vain to become caliph in the place of the caliph. This is the destiny that appears to await Turkeys President Recep Tayyip Erdogan following the unexpected electoral success of the Kurdish HDP that removed his absolute majority for the first time since his Justice and Freedom (AKP) party entered the Turkish political scene, and with it the possibility of forming a one-party government. His progressive Islamization programme for Turkey suffered a blow that is perhaps irreversible. It is a programme that has been followed without hesitation and, for a long time, has also enjoyed the short-sighted support of the European Union. In its desire to reduce militarism in a country that has been negotiating membership, the EU has conscientiously supported all measures aimed at removing power from the very armed forces to which Ataturks constitutional legacy entrusted control and the ultimate defence of the nations secular nature. Occasionally, Brussels even encouraged these measures, accelerating a perhaps inevitable process, but one that achieved what was probably undeserved respectability from Brussels. Erdoğans electoral setback also appears to be affecting the complex web of foreign policy that Turkey is currently weaving. Ankara is operating with a Realpolitik that, in many cases, goes well beyond the limits of traditional morality. In plain language, what he would like is that the acts of a country be guided by values beyond its interests and rejecting the Machiavellian approach stating that the end always justifies the means. Who is the spider at the centre of the Turkish web is a subject frequently discussed. Previously this role was unhesitatingly assigned to Erdogan. His foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, was seen as the ideologue of reference. It was the classic duo of men of power; one had the strategic vision and the other was able to turn that vision into reality. Then, apparently, the two paths separated as both men developed politically and their roles changed, with Erdogan becoming president and Davutoglu becoming prime minister. There is now often talk of disagreements between the two and the possibility of them opposing one another. Is the disagreement between the two real? Or are we seeing yet another version of the drama of the two policemen, with Davutoglu playing the good cop and Erdogan, obviously, the bad one? All this is taking place as the country is trying to establish itself as a regional power, recovering at least some of the Ottoman Empires prestige and area of influence, while two wars are being fought within the Islamic universe, neither declared, but no less serious, in which Turkey is one of the major participants and while tensions between Ankara and the Kurds are about to become an open civil war. Very difficult conditions indeed. It is perhaps for this reason that Erdogan and Turkey appear to be following, contemporaneously, two diverging strategic paths in the short term that will converge in the long term, and even perhaps in the medium term. The first is the most obvious strategy, which centres around the image of a nation that must remain as pure, as pro-Western and as pro-NATO as possible. This was seen in the recent concessions made in Cyprus, where apparently, for the first time, there was serious talk of removing the wall that separates the two communities. Then came the concession for the use of the U.S. air base at Incirlick for use by the anti-Islamic State coalition, which had been previously, obstinately, denied. Then came the idea of establishing a buffer zone in Syria, allowing hundreds of thousands of refugees to escape the dangers of war. And finally, the announcement of intervention against the Caliphate, with little attention given to the fact that this is limited to firing an occasional artillery round, while the real action is aimed at Kurds belonging to the PKK, definitely burying the truce in force since 2013. The second strategy is hidden and, as such, revealed in all its aspects only to a few in power. In analyzing it, we are venturing into the field of hypotheses, not certainties, with all the randomness of judgement that that entails. If we concentrate our reasoning on cui prodest? , it immediately becomes clear how the actions of Islamic State benefit, in no uncertain terms, the Sunnis, who are involved in an undeclared war without quarter against the Shia. This conflict will decide which of the two sides will prevail in the Islamic universe and will define more or less definite borders between the two opposing religious confessions. Republica