From hope to despair in North Korea
When Kim Jong Un took over, there was hope that North-South relations would improve. Two years after, those hopes are gone. But the threat of NKs nukes and the need to engage Pyongyang in meaningful talks are stronger than ever
Joseph R. DeTrani
Two years ago, when Kim Jong Un succeeded his father, Kim Jong Il, there was hope that North-South relations would improve and that Six Party Talks negotiations to resolve the nuclear issue with North Korea could be resumed. There was hope that this new young leader would move North Korea on a path toward reconciliation with the international community and eventual normal relations with South Korea, the U.S. and Japan. In fact, the work necessary to move North Korea in that direction was done by his father, and memorialized in the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement signed by North Korea, which committed the North to comprehensive and verifiable nuclear dismantlement in return for security assurances, economic assistance, the provision of light water reactors and ultimately, normal relations.
Two years ago there was guarded optimism that Kim Jung Un would move North Korea in this direction. That he would surround himself with officials interested in improving the dire economic situation in the country and improving strained relations with South Korea, the U.S. and Japan. The first few months fueled this optimism, with Kim Jun Un replacing some of the hard-line senior military officers close to his father, like Army Chief of Staff Ri Yong Ho, and aligning himself and his government with people like Jang Sung Thaek, his uncle who was a senior Party official and the Vice Chairman of the powerful National Defense Commission, reputed to be a moderate, close to China and interested in economic reform. Reports at that time of modest agricultural reforms and free trade zones with China were encouraging.
The few months of optimism were dashed when North Korea launched missiles in April and December 2012, had a nuclear test in February 2013 and from March to June 2013 threatened South Korea and the U.S. with pre-emptive nuclear attacks. The North also ceased cooperating with the South at the Kaesong Joint Industrial Park and removed all South Koreans from the Park, suspended North-South family reunions, imprisoned Kenneth Bae, a U.S. missionary, for unknown reasons, and summarily removed an 85 year old U.S. tourist from a plane leaving Pyongyang, also for unknown reasons. It wasnt coincidental for those who follow events in North Korea that during this period of escalation and tension, Jang Song Thaek was no longer in the news and a number of military hard-liners, officials like Kim Kyok Sik and Kim Yong Chol, had returned to positions of prominence in the North.
The December 2013 execution of Kims uncle, Jang Song Thaek, and the theatrics that surrounded the public humiliation of his uncle prior to his announced execution left many, myself included, saddened by this inhumane treatment, regardless of the so-called offenses Jang committed. The disappearance of Kim Kong Hui, Kim Jung Uns Aunt and wife of Jang Song Thaek removed another key figure who, after the death of Kim Jung Il, was viewed as a moderate voice facilitating the transition of a 29 year old Kim into the supreme leadership position in the North.
Recently, North Korea had expressed an interest in improving relations with the South. The South responded with a proposal for family reunions, of those families separated during the Korean War, during mid-February at Mount Kumgang, a scenic spot in the North that previously was available to South Korean tourists until a few years ago a tourist from the South was shot and killed by a security guard at this site. The Souths failed efforts to get the North to apologize for the death of this tourist resulted in the South suspending future tourist groups from visiting this site, which was a revenue generator for the North.
Hopefully, with the Souths offer to have these reunions at Mount Kumgang, and the Norths expressed interest in improved relations, Pyongyang will implement their agreement with the South to have these reunions take place from February 20 to 25.
If the current impasse with North Korea continues, its likely the North will persist with another nuclear test and additional missile launches, probably to include the KN-08, a mobile ICBM with significant reach. The North apparently has restarted their Plutonium reactor at Yongbyon and, based on media reporting, also expanded their uranium enrichment facility at this site.
Thus the North, using both Plutonium and Enriched Uranium, most likely will intensify efforts to enlarge its nuclear arsenal for weaponization purposes and pursue efforts to miniaturize these weapons with the goal of achieving a capability to mate these nuclear weapons to missile delivery systems.
The latter is a difficult process, requiring significant testing, but based on the Norths past behavior, its likely they will pursue this goal, at any cost, to include diverting scarce resourcesfrom producing needed food forits people.
The author was the Special Envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea
