The crisis of the Arab world from Aleppo to Mosul
The liberation of Iraqs second-largest city offers a rare chance to assuage Sunni anger
SURVEY the rubble of the Fertile Crescent and a disturbing pattern emerges: from the Mediterranean to the Gulf, those bearing the brunt of war are for the most part Sunni Arabs. Though they form the largest ethnic group and are heirs of fabled empires, many of their great cities are in the hands of others: the Jews in Jerusalem; the Christians and Shias in Beirut; the Alawites in Damascus; and, latterly, the Shias in Baghdad. Sunnis make up most of the regions refugees. Where Sunnis hold on to power, as in the Gulf states, they feel encircled by a hostile Iran and abandoned by an indifferent America.
The malaise goes beyond sectarianism. The Arab state is in crisis almost everywhere, aggravated by decades of misrule, not least by Sunni leaders. Think only of Iraqs appalling ex-president, Saddam Hussein, the quintessential Sunni Arab strongman; or of Egypts flawed leader, Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi. The Sunnis sense that they are assailed from all sides helps to explain how the jihadists of Islamic State (IS), offering to restore the ancient caliphate, were able to take over vast Sunni-populated areas in Syria and Iraq. No battlefield victory against jihadists will be complete, and no diplomatic solution will be lasting, until the Sunnis dispossession is dealt with.
Right now the future of the region is being decided in two venerable cities: Aleppo, the last urban redoubt of the Syrian rebellion against Mr Assad; and Mosul, ISs most prized possession in Iraq. The conduct of the battles, and the political order that follows them, will determine the course of the regions barbaric wars. The best hope for peace lies in federalism and decentralisation to give Sunnis, and others, a proper voice.
A tale of two cities
Aleppo is the symbol of the worst sort of external intervention. Russia is helping Syrian troops, and their Iranian and Shia allies, pound the besieged Sunni rebels. It looks like an attempt to take the entire city before Barack Obama leaves office next year, convinced that he will do nothing to stop them. The deliberate brutality, in which hospitals are repeatedly attacked, will only feed Sunni resentment and extremism; so will Russias insistence that Mr Assad should remain in charge of any future power-sharing government.
Mosul, by contrast, could yet become a model for defeating the jihadists and creating a saner politics that recognises Sunni Arabs stake in Iraq (see article). Iraqi, Kurdish and local Sunni forces are closing on the city, with American support; the jihadists are fraying. The operation to retake Mosul is due to begin this month, and may give Mr Obama a farewell triumph. The loss of Mosul would deal a blow to IS; it was from there that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the IS leader, declared his caliphate.
Much can go wrong in Mosul. Nobody knows how hard IS will fight. There are worries that the Iraqi government has not done enough to prepare for a mass exodus of civilians; or that it will be unable to prevent an armed free-for-all by Shia, Kurdish and rival Sunni militias. But for all of its violence and chaos, Iraq offers real hope. Its politics are more open than those of most Arab countries, with a feisty press and an obstreperous parliament. Cross-sectarian alliances are starting to form. Shia politicians want to shake off their image as clients of Iran, while Sunni Arab ones are moving away from the politics of rejection and the dream of reconquering Baghdad.
After the failures of Arab nationalism, Islamism and jihadism, Iraq could yet give the Arab world a welcome new model of devolved power. This would make it harder for murderous dictators to terrorise their people, and give diverse ethnic groups the sense that they rule themselves. Would-be separatists, notably the Kurds, might be convinced to remain within existing frontiers.
Looser, more flexible forms of government could ease some of the conflicts of the Arab world, even the terrible bloodletting in Syria. The balance of power will vary but should follow a few basic principles. First, because no region is ethnically pure, sub-entities must respect minority rights. Second, all groups should have a share of power in the central government. Third, national resources, eg, oil, must benefit the whole population. And fourth, the hardest, is to find the right balance of armed force between national armies and local police forces, so that minorities feel protected and local warlords are discouraged from rebelling or breaking away
Iraqs constitution provides for much of this, on paper at least. It should be made a reality. Devolution may not end political quarrels; but if it stops the bloodshed that will be progress indeed. So Mosul must be captured judiciously, with care for civilians and political agreement on how it will be run after the defeat of IS. The city is not only a test of the maturity of Iraqs politics, but also of the responsibility of outside powers. Saudi Arabia and Iran should support reconciliation and reconstruction. Western forces should not rush out.
The Economist
