Uzbekistan starts a new era, but will old wounds fester?

Karimov was, until his death, the sole occupant of Uzbekistan’s presidency. Nearly half of his compatriots, born around the time of Uzbekistan’s emergence as an independent state following the Soviet Union’s dissolution, have known no other leader

Uzbekistan has predominated Central Asia since the Soviet Union’s demise in 1991. Home to 30 million people – almost half of Central Asia’s entire population – it possesses the largest and most formidable military of any state in the region. Expected to collapse soon after its birth, Uzbekistan has remained largely stable despite being in one of the most volatile parts of the world.

Islam Karimov cast such a deep shadow over Uzbekistan that, when his death at the age of 78 was announced at the beginning of this month, many expected his subordinates to plunge the country into a destabilising war of succession.
Karimov was, until his death, the sole occupant of Uzbekistan’s presidency. Nearly half of his compatriots, born around the time of Uzbekistan’s emergence as an independent state following the Soviet Union’s dissolution, have known no other leader. Karimov did not invest in a personality cult, yet he loomed so large that it was an act of heresy even to contemplate a future without him.
Karimov’s authority depended on a complex system of patronage, concession and accommodation. Unlike others in the region, Karimov did not expend a great deal of energy on building a political dynasty. His eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, was for a while seen as his heiress. She was a pampered daughter, indulged by her father. She modelled and sang on television, started a fashion label and held diplomatic sinecures in Europe. After obtaining a degree from Harvard, she took charge of Uzbekistan’s telecommunications sector. But she was too brazen. Multiple agencies in Europe and the US are investigating allegations that she received millions of dollars in bribes for doling out operating licences.
Gulnara was destroyed by her own hubris. Instead of striving to co-opt the power brokers who buttressed her father’s rule, she sought to displace them.
She published on her Twitter account attacks against important figures in her father’s administration. Rustam Inoyatov, chief of Uzbekistan’s National Security Service, was one of her targets. Mr Inoyatov’s retaliation was swift: Gulnara’s businesses were requisitioned, her Twitter account was suspended and she was placed under house arrest. Gulnara’s downfall reveals the limits of Karimov’s power in his final years. Her arrest coincided with the hasty promulgation of legislation that significantly lowered the eligibility requirements for the presidency.
The election of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, a long-serving prime minister, as Karimov’s interim successor suggests that there is unlikely to be a protracted power struggle. Constitutionally, power should have been transferred to the head of the senate, Ilgizar Sobirov, for three months. In the event, Mr Sobirov acted as president for about 48 hours.
It is not insignificant that parliament elected Mr Mirziyoyev and not Rustam Azimov, the relatively sophisticated finance minister, who had a close relationship with Karimov.
In fact, Mr Azimov, whose name was being bandied about hopefully in western capitals as a potential successor, was not even a contender when parliament voted.
Even if a challenge were to materialise in the future, Mr Mirziyoyev, now occupying the president’s office, can comfortably fend it off. The election mandated by the constitution will ratify his power. What remains of the Karimov family’s clout will eventually evaporate.
Karimov’s success in forging a stable Uzbekistan depended in part on luck. Hardly anyone noticed or cared when Uzbekistan became embroiled in a war with Wahhabi Islamists in the early 1990s. The long decades of enforced atheism under Soviet rule concealed the slow radicalisation of aggrieved Muslims in the conservative Fergana Valley.
By the time Uzbekistan became a sovereign state in 1991, they were a force to be reckoned with. Karimov at first tried to parley with them, but later recoiled as their demands became too unreasonable.
His government, having attempted briefly to use religion as a glue to bind the disparate peoples who occupied its territory, began cracking down on people it branded "Wahhabi". It was a fierce contest. In 1997, Islamists beheaded an Uzbek policeman. By 1999, having found sanctuary and sponsorship in Pakistan, Uzbekistan’s radical Islamists nearly assassinated Karimov in a series of explosions in Tashkent. Karimov’s reprisals earned him international rebukes.
But after the attacks of September 11, 2001, he became indispensable to the American war in Afghanistan. Not only were his crackdowns forgiven – but he also began receiving vast sums of cash to intensify them.
The 2005 massacre in Andijan – during which Uzbek troops opened fire on protesters – led to the termination of Karimov’s special relationship with the United States. But the void was soon filled by China. Beijing’s ambitious revival of the ancient Silk Road is dependent for success on Tashkent’s cooperation, and its investment in Uzbekistan now outstrips Russia’s.

    thenationa.ae

Uzbekistan starts a new era, but will old wounds fester?

Karimov was, until his death, the sole occupant of Uzbekistans presidency. Nearly half of his compatriots, born around the time of Uzbekistans emergence as an independent state following the Soviet Unions dissolution, have known no other leader

Uzbekistan has predominated Central Asia since the Soviet Unions demise in 1991. Home to 30 million people almost half of Central Asias entire population it possesses the largest and most formidable military of any state in the region. Expected to collapse soon after its birth, Uzbekistan has remained largely stable despite being in one of the most volatile parts of the world. Islam Karimov cast such a deep shadow over Uzbekistan that, when his death at the age of 78 was announced at the beginning of this month, many expected his subordinates to plunge the country into a destabilising war of succession. Karimov was, until his death, the sole occupant of Uzbekistans presidency. Nearly half of his compatriots, born around the time of Uzbekistans emergence as an independent state following the Soviet Unions dissolution, have known no other leader. Karimov did not invest in a personality cult, yet he loomed so large that it was an act of heresy even to contemplate a future without him. Karimovs authority depended on a complex system of patronage, concession and accommodation. Unlike others in the region, Karimov did not expend a great deal of energy on building a political dynasty. His eldest daughter, Gulnara Karimova, was for a while seen as his heiress. She was a pampered daughter, indulged by her father. She modelled and sang on television, started a fashion label and held diplomatic sinecures in Europe. After obtaining a degree from Harvard, she took charge of Uzbekistans telecommunications sector. But she was too brazen. Multiple agencies in Europe and the US are investigating allegations that she received millions of dollars in bribes for doling out operating licences. Gulnara was destroyed by her own hubris. Instead of striving to co-opt the power brokers who buttressed her fathers rule, she sought to displace them. She published on her Twitter account attacks against important figures in her fathers administration. Rustam Inoyatov, chief of Uzbekistans National Security Service, was one of her targets. Mr Inoyatovs retaliation was swift: Gulnaras businesses were requisitioned, her Twitter account was suspended and she was placed under house arrest. Gulnaras downfall reveals the limits of Karimovs power in his final years. Her arrest coincided with the hasty promulgation of legislation that significantly lowered the eligibility requirements for the presidency. The election of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, a long-serving prime minister, as Karimovs interim successor suggests that there is unlikely to be a protracted power struggle. Constitutionally, power should have been transferred to the head of the senate, Ilgizar Sobirov, for three months. In the event, Mr Sobirov acted as president for about 48 hours. It is not insignificant that parliament elected Mr Mirziyoyev and not Rustam Azimov, the relatively sophisticated finance minister, who had a close relationship with Karimov. In fact, Mr Azimov, whose name was being bandied about hopefully in western capitals as a potential successor, was not even a contender when parliament voted. Even if a challenge were to materialise in the future, Mr Mirziyoyev, now occupying the presidents office, can comfortably fend it off. The election mandated by the constitution will ratify his power. What remains of the Karimov familys clout will eventually evaporate. Karimovs success in forging a stable Uzbekistan depended in part on luck. Hardly anyone noticed or cared when Uzbekistan became embroiled in a war with Wahhabi Islamists in the early 1990s. The long decades of enforced atheism under Soviet rule concealed the slow radicalisation of aggrieved Muslims in the conservative Fergana Valley. By the time Uzbekistan became a sovereign state in 1991, they were a force to be reckoned with. Karimov at first tried to parley with them, but later recoiled as their demands became too unreasonable. His government, having attempted briefly to use religion as a glue to bind the disparate peoples who occupied its territory, began cracking down on people it branded Wahhabi. It was a fierce contest. In 1997, Islamists beheaded an Uzbek policeman. By 1999, having found sanctuary and sponsorship in Pakistan, Uzbekistans radical Islamists nearly assassinated Karimov in a series of explosions in Tashkent. Karimovs reprisals earned him international rebukes. But after the attacks of September 11, 2001, he became indispensable to the American war in Afghanistan. Not only were his crackdowns forgiven but he also began receiving vast sums of cash to intensify them. The 2005 massacre in Andijan during which Uzbek troops opened fire on protesters led to the termination of Karimovs special relationship with the United States. But the void was soon filled by China. Beijings ambitious revival of the ancient Silk Road is dependent for success on Tashkents cooperation, and its investment in Uzbekistan now outstrips Russias. thenationa.ae