How Tehran seeks to frame war in Yemen
Majid Rafizadeh
While Hassan Rouhani and his foreign minister Javad Zarif set the tone, they do not enjoy the final say in Irans policy towards Yemen.
Instead, the major decision makers are Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the senior cadre of Irans Revolutionary Guard Corps. Although there exist religious affinities between Iran and the Houthis, the convergence of a number of strategic interests is the main driving force behind Tehran-Houthi commonalities.
Khamenei and the IRGC are utilising several means when it comes to Yemens war. Irans supreme leader is heavily reliant on rhetoric and social media to spread his message on Yemen.
That outcome was entirely predictable, some would say from the moment the armed group took control of the capital Sanaa in September. Others might see the watershed moment as president Abradu Mansur Hadis resignation on January 22. Either way, it was inevitable that something would happen after the Houthis set an impossible deadline for an all-party political arrangement. It expired last Wednesday and the Houthis have dissolved parliament. The big question now is how do the Gulf nations in particular Yemens large northern neighbour, Saudi Arabia respond?
This is the first foreign policy challenge for Saudi Arabias new king and a difficult one at that. The situation in Yemen is untenable. The rebels, with the backing of Iran and members of former president Abdullah Salehs deposed regime, have announced the creation of a supreme revolutionary committee. It is supposed to rule for two years. Despite announcing that their move will take Yemen to safe shores, the Houthis appear to have no game plan, strategy or vision for the future. Houthi leaders are being disingenuous at best when they say that the new committee will be inclusive.
More to the point, they are being foolishly optimistic if they think that controlling Sanaa by force means they have political control over the whole country. Their takeover may strengthen the southern separatist movements desire to secede and in the short term, it may suit the United States to cooperate with a Houthi-led government in attacking Al Qaeda in Yemen targets. But the current political arrangement in Sanaa, which disenfranchises so many Yemenis, is not in the interests of the country or the region.
Lets be clear, the Houthis are a minority who have seized control with guns. If Yemen is to continue to exist as a cohesive state, which is in everybodys interests, it must be ruled by a government that represents all its citizens. Iran must stop its meddling, while Yemens Gulf neighbours, and the wider world, must stand together to help the country achieve true political inclusivity and stability.
Currently, Irans message is that the war in Yemen is the struggle of the oppressed against the oppressors.
In addition, one of the core revolutionary slogans of the Islamic republic is that Iran views itself as the saviour of the oppressed.
As a result, Irans narrative towards the conflict in Yemen is placed within Tehrans broader ideological principles. The Supreme Leader has used his recent speeches to emphasise this principle.
Iran projects its role in Yemen as limited to humanitarian assistance in order to help the oppressed.
Iranian leaders have continually denied giving any military and weapons assistance to the Houthis, but why does it issue such denials?
An Iranian diplomat once told me it is not in its interests to advertise the deployment of hard power against the will of the majority.
Another layer of complexity is that the Iranian government views the war in Yemen through the terms of its rivalry with Saudi Arabia.
The writer is an Iranian-American Havard scholar and president of the International American Council on the Middle East
