Why the West misunderstands Russia’s challenge?

Looking past the bluster and hyperbole of Russia’s political leaders and business elites

With its saber-rattling over the last months, the Kremlin has succeeded in taking large parts of the Western elite under its “reflexive control.”
That term refers to a Soviet strategy of action designed to trigger desired reactions on the enemy’s side.
Moscow has done its utmost to convince politicians, journalists, soldiers, intellectuals and diplomats around the world that Russia is posing a serious military threat, and that if necessary it is up for a fight against NATO – perhaps, even for World War III.
As a result, the West’s political and military leaders are busy responding to threats that are, in fact, largely ephemeral. Brussels and Washington, for their parts, are insufficiently attentive and inadequately reacting to really existing new challenges in Europe’s east.
Such distraction is the very purpose of the Kremlin’s confrontational stance towards the West. Rather than contemplating the actual nature, real risks and final purposes of Russia’s demonstratively aggressive posture, NATO’s generals are fighting the last war – the Cold one – over again.
The West’s biggest failure at this juncture is this: Instead of soberly assessing the real nature of today Russia’s challenge and exploring the entire gamut of the West’s new options to respond, a collective sense of déjà-vu has taken hold in large parts of the Western elites.
NATO’s and the EU’s resulting incomplete and misconceived rebuttals are serving, rather than containing, the Kremlin. And they are increasing insecurity in Eastern Europe, rather than decreasing it.
This leads to a situation full of existential risks for humanity, yet beneficial to the stability and sustainability of Putin’s regime.
NATO and its member states are over-reacting rhetorically, militarily and politically to Russia’s new aggressiveness. Without realizing, they are barking up the wrong tree, and playing Moscow’s game.
Western politicians and military men are sending, on an almost daily basis now, public oral and written messages to Moscow responding to its military provocations along Russia’s western borders, and subversive activities on EU territory.
NATO troops and installations are moving eastwards. West and East European defense budgets are on a steep rise. A possible new intra-EU enlargement of NATO, i.e., an inclusion of Finland or/and Sweden, is being contemplated. With a consensus on a Russia strategy missing in both Europe and the United States, there will be many traps along the road in the coming years that could evolve into more tensions within that strategic triangle.
From both Moscow and Berlin, German-Russian relations are being proclaimed as never better. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier underlined the good relations by calling for a “German-Russian modernization partnership.”
Russian President Medvedev and Foreign Minister Steinmeier know each other well from previous jobs. They had a good deal of contact when Medvedev was running Gazprom and Steinmeier was Chief of Staff under Chancellor Gerhard Schröder.
Chancellor Merkel also met with Medvedev in March 2008 right after his election and was the first head of state to congratulate him. She also took along some high-level business leaders on the trip, as did Mr. Steinmeier.
There are many factors that define relations between Germany and Russia in a different manner than that between Russia and the United States. One of them is trade. Russian-German trade reached a record $52.8 billion in 2007, with German investment in Russia increasing 70 per centyear on year, to $3.4 billion.
Germany is also Russia’s largest importer in Europe, and the EU is the overwhelming trade partner for Russia — dwarfing trade between Russia and the United States.
While the EU is Russia’s most important trade partner, with 52 per centof all trade in Russia happening with EU countries, the United States only holds sixth place, with a marginal 4%.
Another dimension is energy. Germany imports roughly 35 per centof its oil and 40 per centof its natural gas from Russia — and that is expected to increase in the coming years. In Europe, non-Russian Soviet successor states are particularly dependent upon Russian gas.
Russian gas represents 98-100 per centof the total natural gas consumed by Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Slovakia.
That is an equation that complicates the process of generating a coherent policy toward Russia, with different degrees and levels of dependence on Russian energy supplies.
Trade between Russia and the United States as well as U.S. energy imports from Russia are a relatively small percentage, even if they are expected to gradually increase in the gas sector. The United States does not receive a significant share of its oil or gas supplies from Moscow.
As NYU political science professor Mark Galeotti has perceptively observed, large parts of the Western elite are doing nothing less than “panicking about Russia’s ‘hybrid’ warfare.”
The alarm bell is being rung by leading national politicians, senior NATO commanders, prestigious think-tanks, opinion-shaping journalists, as well as seasoned Western diplomats.
It is exactly this alarmism – and less a real conflict – that the Kremlin’s posturing is trying to achieve. Moscow would be simply unable to fight a real new Cold, let alone a hot, war with the West. Why?
There is a well-known, but nowadays often forgotten fundamental difference between the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union that points to a related fundamental paradox of Moscow’s new confrontation with the West.
The Russian Federation is much weaker than the USSR. Unlike Moscow’s former communist leadership and largely autarkic planned industry, Russia’s new ruling elite and inflexible petro-economy are deeply integrated with the West.
Looks at Russia’s major pipeline destinations, its foreign direct investors, its most attractive tourism sites, its private real estate locations, its regular or secret bank accounts, its preferred shopping malls, or its popular foreign educational institutions.
In all of those arenas, a large part of the Russian elite’s core interests are located in, connected with, or related to, countries that are members of NATO, the EU, or both. (Some of the remainder is in places closely tied to them, like Switzerland).

The writer is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, Kiev

Why the West misunderstands Russias challenge?

Looking past the bluster and hyperbole of Russias political leaders and business elites

With its saber-rattling over the last months, the Kremlin has succeeded in taking large parts of the Western elite under its reflexive control. That term refers to a Soviet strategy of action designed to trigger desired reactions on the enemys side. Moscow has done its utmost to convince politicians, journalists, soldiers, intellectuals and diplomats around the world that Russia is posing a serious military threat, and that if necessary it is up for a fight against NATO perhaps, even for World War III. As a result, the Wests political and military leaders are busy responding to threats that are, in fact, largely ephemeral. Brussels and Washington, for their parts, are insufficiently attentive and inadequately reacting to really existing new challenges in Europes east. Such distraction is the very purpose of the Kremlins confrontational stance towards the West. Rather than contemplating the actual nature, real risks and final purposes of Russias demonstratively aggressive posture, NATOs generals are fighting the last war the Cold one over again. The Wests biggest failure at this juncture is this: Instead of soberly assessing the real nature of today Russias challenge and exploring the entire gamut of the Wests new options to respond, a collective sense of dj-vu has taken hold in large parts of the Western elites. NATOs and the EUs resulting incomplete and misconceived rebuttals are serving, rather than containing, the Kremlin. And they are increasing insecurity in Eastern Europe, rather than decreasing it. This leads to a situation full of existential risks for humanity, yet beneficial to the stability and sustainability of Putins regime. NATO and its member states are over-reacting rhetorically, militarily and politically to Russias new aggressiveness. Without realizing, they are barking up the wrong tree, and playing Moscows game. Western politicians and military men are sending, on an almost daily basis now, public oral and written messages to Moscow responding to its military provocations along Russias western borders, and subversive activities on EU territory. NATO troops and installations are moving eastwards. West and East European defense budgets are on a steep rise. A possible new intra-EU enlargement of NATO, i.e., an inclusion of Finland or/and Sweden, is being contemplated. With a consensus on a Russia strategy missing in both Europe and the United States, there will be many traps along the road in the coming years that could evolve into more tensions within that strategic triangle. From both Moscow and Berlin, German-Russian relations are being proclaimed as never better. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier underlined the good relations by calling for a German-Russian modernization partnership. Russian President Medvedev and Foreign Minister Steinmeier know each other well from previous jobs. They had a good deal of contact when Medvedev was running Gazprom and Steinmeier was Chief of Staff under Chancellor Gerhard Schrder. Chancellor Merkel also met with Medvedev in March 2008 right after his election and was the first head of state to congratulate him. She also took along some high-level business leaders on the trip, as did Mr. Steinmeier. There are many factors that define relations between Germany and Russia in a different manner than that between Russia and the United States. One of them is trade. Russian-German trade reached a record $52.8 billion in 2007, with German investment in Russia increasing 70 per centyear on year, to $3.4 billion. Germany is also Russias largest importer in Europe, and the EU is the overwhelming trade partner for Russia dwarfing trade between Russia and the United States. While the EU is Russias most important trade partner, with 52 per centof all trade in Russia happening with EU countries, the United States only holds sixth place, with a marginal 4%. Another dimension is energy. Germany imports roughly 35 per centof its oil and 40 per centof its natural gas from Russia and that is expected to increase in the coming years. In Europe, non-Russian Soviet successor states are particularly dependent upon Russian gas. Russian gas represents 98-100 per centof the total natural gas consumed by Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Slovakia. That is an equation that complicates the process of generating a coherent policy toward Russia, with different degrees and levels of dependence on Russian energy supplies. Trade between Russia and the United States as well as U.S. energy imports from Russia are a relatively small percentage, even if they are expected to gradually increase in the gas sector. The United States does not receive a significant share of its oil or gas supplies from Moscow. As NYU political science professor Mark Galeotti has perceptively observed, large parts of the Western elite are doing nothing less than panicking about Russias hybrid warfare. The alarm bell is being rung by leading national politicians, senior NATO commanders, prestigious think-tanks, opinion-shaping journalists, as well as seasoned Western diplomats. It is exactly this alarmism and less a real conflict that the Kremlins posturing is trying to achieve. Moscow would be simply unable to fight a real new Cold, let alone a hot, war with the West. Why? There is a well-known, but nowadays often forgotten fundamental difference between the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union that points to a related fundamental paradox of Moscows new confrontation with the West. The Russian Federation is much weaker than the USSR. Unlike Moscows former communist leadership and largely autarkic planned industry, Russias new ruling elite and inflexible petro-economy are deeply integrated with the West. Looks at Russias major pipeline destinations, its foreign direct investors, its most attractive tourism sites, its private real estate locations, its regular or secret bank accounts, its preferred shopping malls, or its popular foreign educational institutions. In all of those arenas, a large part of the Russian elites core interests are located in, connected with, or related to, countries that are members of NATO, the EU, or both. (Some of the remainder is in places closely tied to them, like Switzerland). The writer is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, Kiev