Turkey�s foreign policy takes shape in a time of terror
The absence of clear
strategy on ISIL
containment as the group ramps up attacks on soft targets in Istanbul is worrying
Joseph Dana
In the arid hills of south-eastern Turkey, an increasingly bloody war is destabilising one of the regions most pivotal countries.
For three decades, Turkey and its Kurdish minority population have fought over demands for sovereignty and national aspirations. A shaky ceasefire signed in 2013 prevented outright bloodletting and offered a period of relative calm; however, that sense of peace disappeared last summer. In a rapid succession of events, Turkeys leadership diverted attention away from domestic and regional challenges to one issue: suppression of the Kurds.
On the surface, the renewed fighting might seem like just another flare-up in the course of a long and fractured relationship. On closer inspection, however, the fighting serves several purposes for Turkey, ranging from asserting the countrys independence to drumming up nationalist support for the current leadership. Having never been colonised in its history but under increasing international pressure to stem the flow of Syrian refugees, confront extremist elements in Syria and play a constructive role in the Middle East, there is a palpable sense in Turkey that outside forces are trying to dictate its destiny. The Kurdish threat is now a pawn that Ankara uses to argue that the international community has left the country to fend for itself in the face of internal challenges.
The Kurds are one of the largest stateless ethnic groups in the Middle East. They span an area that includes south-eastern Turkey and western Iran, northern Iraq and Syria, with varying degrees of autonomy. In Turkey, their population numbers between 14 to 25 million people, depending on who you ask.
The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a Marxist militant organisation that the United States and the European Union considers a terrorist organisation, has led the fight for national rights against Ankara.
Since the ceasefire broke down last year and the government called off the peace process, the Turkish army has moved into Kurdish areas in the countrys south-east and laid siege to major cities. Historic areas inside of towns like Diyarbakir have been levelled.
The PKK has responded with sustained attacks on Turkish security forces, while radical offshoots such as the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) have carried out suicide bombings in major cities such as Ankara, killing scores of civilians and terrifying the population.
Ankara sees the PKK as the most important problem the country is facing in the short-term, says Ali Sokman, a Turkey analyst at Control Risks in Istanbul.
The security-oriented shift in politics since March 2015 has slowed down much-needed reforms in the economy as well as reforms for a lasting solution to the Kurdish issue, which are more important medium-to-long term challenges.
Always suspicious of foreign intervention, Turkeys leadership broadcasts a sense of inflated regional power throughout all of these crises. Since an ISIL suicide bomber targeted a group of tourists in the heart of Istanbuls European Side, Turkey has been quick to discount foreign assistance and has ramped up its rhetoric that the Kurds are the ultimate threat to the Turkish state.
According to Ceren Kenar, a columnist with Turkiye newspaper and TV producer with Haberturk News Channel, the picture is much less
clear.
Security concerns are probably the most challenging and biggest problem for Turkish officials now, says Kenar. The question of whether ISIL or the PKK is more dangerous is tricky. The PKK took more lives in Turkey and enjoys a wider popular support and stands as a more sophisticated enemy. On the other hand, unlike ISIL, the PKK is perceived as a negotiable actor. Turkey would never imagine having peace talks with ISIL, yet it did and in the future probably will have talks with the PKK.
Thanks to a series of bad decisions and the mismanagement of legitimate domestic concerns over Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogans quest for power, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been forced to find a scapegoat for the countrys ills and its inability to protect its own citizens.
The Kurds have filled this vacuum, while the ISIL threat has largely taken a back seat. Turkey is increasingly arguing this position on the international stage too. During a recent trip to Washington, US support for Syrian Kurdish groups with links to the PKK was a major Turkish talking point.
As such, the long-standing feud with the Kurds has become the ideal diversion both from Turkeys fledgling plans to be a new regional power and its failure to protect its citizens.
Mehmet Metiner, an AKP parliament member, recently wrote on Al Jazeera that the Kurds endgame is to divide Turkey, and failing that, to plunge the country into political turmoil so that it is once again dependent on foreign powers. Therefore, they want the old Turkey back, the one that could be easily manipulated.
In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, Turkey found itself in a very different position than where it is today. Erdogan cast himself as a religiously-minded reformer who was open to business but in touch with conservative values. The country was raising capital after a decade of major infrastructure projects and the rapid growth of Turkish state brands such as the national airline.
Istanbuls emergent yet eternal appeal was the crown jewel of Erdogans new Turkey. Long ignored as a melancholy relic of Ottoman power, Erdogan rebranded his city as the centre of the new Middle East. His foreign policy objectives followed this line of neo-Ottoman power.
thenational.ae
