Sceptred sway

Earning the enmity of Iran carries perils as Pakistan is home to the second largest Shia population in the world

In the 1960S, a proxy war broke out in Yemen. At the time, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the charismatic Egyptian leader, was determined to spread his doctrine of pan-Arabism in the region. From his base of power in mighty Cairo, Nasser began stirring a revolt among the Yemeni soldiery with the aim of dislodging the monarchy there, in much the same manner he had overthrown Egypt’s own King Farouk a decade earlier. Fearful of the spread of secular nationalism, the Saudi monarchy extended its support to the royalists propping up Yemen’s Zaydi throne, freshly vacated by the death of Imam Ahmed, a clownish figure whose private amusements were said to include drowning dwarves and playing with toy trains.

The Saudis couldn’t challenge the Egyptians alone, so they enlisted, among others (including Iran), the support of Pakistan—a fellow Muslim country eager to operate as a pro-American ally in the Cold War. During his reign, General Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s first military ruler, dispatched Pakistani pilots who slipped into Saudi-marked jets to strafe the republicans from the air, while Pakistani weaponry was lucratively hawked to the ultimately triumphant royalists on the ground.
Half a century later, following a series of complex Yemeni tribal struggles, history attempts to repeat itself. In 2015, it is the Zaydis, in the form of Houthi rebels, ranged against the Saudis, who began to conduct air strikes in Yemen in March. The Houthis have formed an alliance with the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, whose brutal and venal dictatorship lasted over three decades before ending in 2012. The Saudis back his successor and former deputy, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and fear that the Houthis represent a front for the Saudis’ chief rivals for regional influence—the Iranians.
To help thwart Tehran’s ambitions, the new Saudi king, Salman, assembled an impressively broad coalition in Yemen. The Gulf countries were all on board, with the exception of Oman, which preens itself as the Switzerland of the Arabian Peninsula. The once wayward Qataris shuffled back into line. The poorer monarchies of Morocco and Jordan chipped in. And Egypt, with the most powerful Arab army, also said it would render services in return for the billions the Saudis have lavished on the one-man rule of President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. (Even Omar Bashir, the Sudanese ruler wanted for war crimes, proffered a modest flock of fighter jets, one of which was soon shot down.)
Pakistanis were surprised to learn that they, too, were being counted among those fighting. It is well known that Pakistani troops were garrisoned in Saudi Arabia during the 1980s, in large enough numbers, as the British-Pakistani writer Tariq Ali once quipped, to mount a takeover of the country. In the teeth of popular domestic opposition, the Pakistanis even dispatched troops to Saudi Arabia during the first Gulf War of 1991. The prime minister at the time was the same man Pakistan has now: Nawaz Sharif.
It is notorious that Sharif is intimate with the Saudi rulers. When his second government conducted Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998, the United States imposed severe sanctions on the country. Relief came from the Saudis, who supplied subsidised oil. Given oil prices had already fallen to their lowest levels, it wasn’t the most generous of gestures, but was nevertheless widely appreciated. When Sharif was toppled by Pervez Musharraf’s coup the following year, it was the Saudis who diplomatically crowbarred him out of jail and set him up in exile in Jeddah, with a special business loan.
Since returning to power in 2013, Sharif has solicited further favours from the Saudis, such as the “friendly gift” of $1.5 billion to shore up a collapsing Pakistani rupee, which has since recovered and held its position. This is not a gift that the Saudis would offer just anyone. The former president Asif Ali Zardari, whom the Saudis intensely disliked, was rebuffed when he went to plead for the deferrence of oil payments in 2008. Nearly two million Pakistanis are employed within the kingdom, and form a large source of remittances; the Saudis also maintain their historic relationship with the Pakistan army.
But it is the very fact of a shared border that makes Pakistani parliamentarians anxious. “The Saudis are our brothers and Iran is our neighbour,” the opposition politician Imran Khan told reporters outside parliament. By picking a side, Khan suggested, Pakistan risked inviting the flames of a regional war between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran that could take on a sectarian colouring. It was better for Pakistan to remain neutral. It already has enough problems at home.
Pakistan has already committed 40 per cent of its troops to the fight against Taliban militants along its western border with Afghanistan, the defence minister told the parliament. The border with Iran curves along the province of Balochistan, where anti-Shia groups massacre Hazaras, and a Baloch separatist insurgency flickers. Already, Pakistan accuses India—to furious denials—of clandestinely destabilising the province. Interference from its large, powerful neighbour to the west is unthinkable: Pakistan isn’t going to risk general Qassem Soleimani—Iran’s famously itinerant “shadow commander,” and an Instagram enthusiast—adding a selfie from Balochistan to his album of war tourism from the Greater Middle East.
Earning the enmity of Iran carries other perils. Pakistan is home to the second largest Shia population in the world. There are no exact figures, but an estimated one out of every five Pakistanis is Shia. The country’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was Shia. Pakistan has had Shias as president and army chief, with rarely a public comment on their affiliation. Unlike the heterodox Ahmadi sect—which was excommunicated at Saudi urging in 1974—Shias have been regarded not as a minority, but one of three strains of mainstream Islam, alongside ascetic Barelvis and literalist Deobandis. By participating in the Saudi-led coalition of Sunni-majority countries, Pakistan would risk taking on an explicitly sectarian identity.
The Saudis have long been adept at arrogating to themselves the status of Islam’s temporal rulers. “Saudi Arabia, as the birthplace of Islam, and the leader of the Muslim and Arab worlds, has a unique responsibility,” Turki al-Faisal, also a former ambassador to the US, once told a Washington audience. But such claims have long been contested. 

Caravan

Sceptred sway

Earning the enmity of Iran carries perils as Pakistan is home to the second largest Shia population in the world

In the 1960S, a proxy war broke out in Yemen. At the time, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the charismatic Egyptian leader, was determined to spread his doctrine of pan-Arabism in the region. From his base of power in mighty Cairo, Nasser began stirring a revolt among the Yemeni soldiery with the aim of dislodging the monarchy there, in much the same manner he had overthrown Egypts own King Farouk a decade earlier. Fearful of the spread of secular nationalism, the Saudi monarchy extended its support to the royalists propping up Yemens Zaydi throne, freshly vacated by the death of Imam Ahmed, a clownish figure whose private amusements were said to include drowning dwarves and playing with toy trains. The Saudis couldnt challenge the Egyptians alone, so they enlisted, among others (including Iran), the support of Pakistana fellow Muslim country eager to operate as a pro-American ally in the Cold War. During his reign, General Ayub Khan, Pakistans first military ruler, dispatched Pakistani pilots who slipped into Saudi-marked jets to strafe the republicans from the air, while Pakistani weaponry was lucratively hawked to the ultimately triumphant royalists on the ground. Half a century later, following a series of complex Yemeni tribal struggles, history attempts to repeat itself. In 2015, it is the Zaydis, in the form of Houthi rebels, ranged against the Saudis, who began to conduct air strikes in Yemen in March. The Houthis have formed an alliance with the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, whose brutal and venal dictatorship lasted over three decades before ending in 2012. The Saudis back his successor and former deputy, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and fear that the Houthis represent a front for the Saudis chief rivals for regional influencethe Iranians. To help thwart Tehrans ambitions, the new Saudi king, Salman, assembled an impressively broad coalition in Yemen. The Gulf countries were all on board, with the exception of Oman, which preens itself as the Switzerland of the Arabian Peninsula. The once wayward Qataris shuffled back into line. The poorer monarchies of Morocco and Jordan chipped in. And Egypt, with the most powerful Arab army, also said it would render services in return for the billions the Saudis have lavished on the one-man rule of President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. (Even Omar Bashir, the Sudanese ruler wanted for war crimes, proffered a modest flock of fighter jets, one of which was soon shot down.) Pakistanis were surprised to learn that they, too, were being counted among those fighting. It is well known that Pakistani troops were garrisoned in Saudi Arabia during the 1980s, in large enough numbers, as the British-Pakistani writer Tariq Ali once quipped, to mount a takeover of the country. In the teeth of popular domestic opposition, the Pakistanis even dispatched troops to Saudi Arabia during the first Gulf War of 1991. The prime minister at the time was the same man Pakistan has now: Nawaz Sharif. It is notorious that Sharif is intimate with the Saudi rulers. When his second government conducted Pakistans nuclear tests in 1998, the United States imposed severe sanctions on the country. Relief came from the Saudis, who supplied subsidised oil. Given oil prices had already fallen to their lowest levels, it wasnt the most generous of gestures, but was nevertheless widely appreciated. When Sharif was toppled by Pervez Musharrafs coup the following year, it was the Saudis who diplomatically crowbarred him out of jail and set him up in exile in Jeddah, with a special business loan. Since returning to power in 2013, Sharif has solicited further favours from the Saudis, such as the friendly gift of $1.5 billion to shore up a collapsing Pakistani rupee, which has since recovered and held its position. This is not a gift that the Saudis would offer just anyone. The former president Asif Ali Zardari, whom the Saudis intensely disliked, was rebuffed when he went to plead for the deferrence of oil payments in 2008. Nearly two million Pakistanis are employed within the kingdom, and form a large source of remittances; the Saudis also maintain their historic relationship with the Pakistan army. But it is the very fact of a shared border that makes Pakistani parliamentarians anxious. The Saudis are our brothers and Iran is our neighbour, the opposition politician Imran Khan told reporters outside parliament. By picking a side, Khan suggested, Pakistan risked inviting the flames of a regional war between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran that could take on a sectarian colouring. It was better for Pakistan to remain neutral. It already has enough problems at home. Pakistan has already committed 40 per cent of its troops to the fight against Taliban militants along its western border with Afghanistan, the defence minister told the parliament. The border with Iran curves along the province of Balochistan, where anti-Shia groups massacre Hazaras, and a Baloch separatist insurgency flickers. Already, Pakistan accuses Indiato furious denialsof clandestinely destabilising the province. Interference from its large, powerful neighbour to the west is unthinkable: Pakistan isnt going to risk general Qassem SoleimaniIrans famously itinerant shadow commander, and an Instagram enthusiastadding a selfie from Balochistan to his album of war tourism from the Greater Middle East. Earning the enmity of Iran carries other perils. Pakistan is home to the second largest Shia population in the world. There are no exact figures, but an estimated one out of every five Pakistanis is Shia. The countrys founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was Shia. Pakistan has had Shias as president and army chief, with rarely a public comment on their affiliation. Unlike the heterodox Ahmadi sectwhich was excommunicated at Saudi urging in 1974Shias have been regarded not as a minority, but one of three strains of mainstream Islam, alongside ascetic Barelvis and literalist Deobandis. By participating in the Saudi-led coalition of Sunni-majority countries, Pakistan would risk taking on an explicitly sectarian identity. The Saudis have long been adept at arrogating to themselves the status of Islams temporal rulers. Saudi Arabia, as the birthplace of Islam, and the leader of the Muslim and Arab worlds, has a unique responsibility, Turki al-Faisal, also a former ambassador to the US, once told a Washington audience. But such claims have long been contested. Caravan