The society must practice tolerance

Tolerance must be practiced voluntarily and one should not be compelled to practice it, otherwise, it would be a case of simply “suffering” or “enduring”

The term “toleration”—from the Latin tolerare: to put up with, countenance or suffer—generally refers to the conditional acceptance of or non-interference with beliefs, actions or practices that one considers being wrong but still “tolerable,” such that they should not be prohibited or constrained. There are many contexts in which we speak of a person or an institution as being tolerant: parents tolerate certain behavior of their children, a friend tolerates the weaknesses of another, a monarch tolerates dissent,  a state tolerates a minority religion, a society tolerates deviant behavior. Thus for any analysis of the motives and reasons for toleration, the relevant contexts need to be taken into account.

It needs to be stressed that there are two boundaries involved in this interpretation of the concept of toleration: the first one lies between (1) the normative realm of those practices and beliefs one agrees with and (2) the realm of the practices and beliefs that one finds wrong but can still tolerate; the second boundary lies between this latter realm and (3) the realm of the intolerable that is strictly rejected. There are thus three, not just two normative realms in a context of toleration.

Finally, one can only speak of toleration where it is practiced voluntarily and is not compelled, for otherwise, it would be a case of simply “suffering” or “enduring” certain things that one rejects but against which one is powerless. It is, however, wrong to conclude from this that the tolerant need to be in a position to effectively prohibit or interfere with the tolerated practices, for a minority that does not have this power may very well be tolerant in holding the view that if it had such power, it would not use it to suppress other parties.

Based on these characteristics, we can identify three paradoxes of toleration that are much discussed in philosophical analyses of the concept, and each one refers to one of the components mentioned above. First, there is the paradox of the tolerant racist, which concerns the objection component. Sometimes people argue that someone who believes that there are “inferior races” the members of which does not deserve equal respect should be “more tolerant.” Thus the racist would be called tolerant if he curbed his desire to discriminate against the members of such groups, say, for strategic reasons. Thus if (and only if) we considered tolerance to be a moral virtue, the paradox arises that an immoral attitude (to think of other “races” in such way) would be turned into part of virtue. What is more, the racist would be more “tolerant” the stronger his racist impulses are if only he did not act on them. Hence, seen from a moral perspective, the demand that the racist should be tolerant has a major flaw: it takes the racist objection against others as an ethical objection that only needs to be restrained by adding certain reasons for acceptance. It thus turns an unacceptable prejudice into an ethical judgment. From this it follows that the reasons for objection must be reasonable in a minimal sense; they cannot be generally shareable, of course, but they must also not rest on irrational prejudice and hatred. The racist, therefore, can neither exemplify the virtue of tolerance nor should he be asked to be tolerant; what is necessary is that he overcome his racist beliefs. This shows that there are cases in which tolerance is not the solution to intolerance.

Second, we encounter the paradox of moral tolerance, which arises in connection with the acceptance component. If both the reasons for objection and the reasons for acceptance are called “moral,” the paradox arises that it seems to be morally right or even morally required to tolerate what is morally wrong. The solution to this paradox, therefore, requires a distinction between various kinds of “moral” reasons, some of which must be reasons of a higher order than ground and limit toleration.

Third, there is the paradox of drawing the limits, which concerns the rejection component. This paradox is inherent in the idea that toleration is a matter of reciprocity and that therefore those who are intolerant need not and cannot be tolerated, an idea we find in most of the classical texts on toleration. But even a brief look at those texts, and even more so at historical practice, shows that the slogan “no toleration of the intolerant” is not just vacuous but potentially dangerous, for the characterization of certain groups as intolerant is all too often itself a result of one-sidedness and intolerance. In a deconstructivist reading, this leads to a fatal conclusion for the concept of toleration: If toleration always implies a drawing of the limits against the intolerant and intolerable, and if every such drawing of a limit is itself a (more or less) intolerant, arbitrary act, toleration ends as soon it begins—as soon as it is defined by an arbitrary boundary between “us” and the “intolerant” and “intolerable.” This paradox can only be overcome if we distinguish between two notions of “intolerance” that the deconstructivist critique conflates: the intolerance of those who lie beyond the limits of toleration because they deny toleration as a norm in the first place and the lack of tolerance of those who do not want to tolerate a denial of the norm. Tolerance can only be a virtue if this distinction can be made, and it presupposes that the limits of toleration can be drawn in a non-arbitrary, justifiable way.

The discussion so far implies that toleration is a normatively dependent concept. This means that by itself it cannot provide the substantive reasons for objection, acceptance, and rejection. It needs further, independent normative resources in order to have a certain substance, content, and limits—and in order to be regarded as something good at all. In itself, therefore, toleration is not a virtue or value; it can only be a value if backed by the right normative reasons.

Any concrete use of the concept of toleration is always situated in particular contexts of normative and political conflict, especially in societies that are transforming towards increased religious, ethical and cultural pluralism – even more so when societies are marked by an increased awareness of such pluralism, with some cultural groups raising new claims for recognition and others looking at their co-citizens with suspicion, despite having lived together for some time in the past. These social conflicts always involve group-based claims for recognition, both in the legal and in the social sphere. The contemporary debate has focused on questions of respecting particular religious practices and beliefs, ranging from certain manners of dress, including the burka, to certain demands to be free from blasphemy and religious insults. The general questions raised here include: What is special about religion as opposed to other cultural identities? When is equal respect called for and what exactly does it imply with respect to, for example, norms of gender equality? What role do past injustices play in weighing claims for recognition, and how much room can there be for autonomous forms of life in a deeply pluralistic society?

To answer the question of which of these conceptions should be the guiding one for a given society, two aspects are most important. The first one requires an assessment of the conflicts that require and allowsfor toleration, given the history and character of the groups involved; and the second requires an adequate and convincing normative justification of toleration in a given social context. It is important to keep in mind that the concept of toleration itself does not provide such a justification; this has to come from other normative resources. And the list of such resources, speaking both historically and systematically, is long.

The writer is  former Head, Department of Medical Sociology, Institute of Epidemiology, Disease

 

 

The society must practice tolerance

Tolerance must be practiced voluntarily and one should not be compelled to practice it, otherwise, it would be a case of simply “suffering” or “enduring”

The term tolerationfrom the Latin tolerare: to put up with, countenance or suffergenerally refers to the conditional acceptance of or non-interference with beliefs, actions or practices that one considers being wrong but still tolerable, such that they should not be prohibited or constrained. There are many contexts in which we speak of a person or an institution as being tolerant: parents tolerate certain behavior of their children, a friend tolerates the weaknesses of another, a monarch tolerates dissent, a state tolerates a minority religion, a society tolerates deviant behavior. Thus for any analysis of the motives and reasons for toleration, the relevant contexts need to be taken into account. It needs to be stressed that there are two boundaries involved in this interpretation of the concept of toleration: the first one lies between (1) the normative realm of those practices and beliefs one agrees with and (2) the realm of the practices and beliefs that one finds wrong but can still tolerate; the second boundary lies between this latter realm and (3) the realm of the intolerable that is strictly rejected. There are thus three, not just two normative realms in a context of toleration. Finally, one can only speak of toleration where it is practiced voluntarily and is not compelled, for otherwise, it would be a case of simply suffering or enduring certain things that one rejects but against which one is powerless. It is, however, wrong to conclude from this that the tolerant need to be in a position to effectively prohibit or interfere with the tolerated practices, for a minority that does not have this power may very well be tolerant in holding the view that if it had such power, it would not use it to suppress other parties. Based on these characteristics, we can identify three paradoxes of toleration that are much discussed in philosophical analyses of the concept, and each one refers to one of the components mentioned above. First, there is the paradox of the tolerant racist, which concerns the objection component. Sometimes people argue that someone who believes that there are inferior races the members of which does not deserve equal respect should be more tolerant. Thus the racist would be called tolerant if he curbed his desire to discriminate against the members of such groups, say, for strategic reasons. Thus if (and only if) we considered tolerance to be a moral virtue, the paradox arises that an immoral attitude (to think of other races in such way) would be turned into part of virtue. What is more, the racist would be more tolerant the stronger his racist impulses are if only he did not act on them. Hence, seen from a moral perspective, the demand that the racist should be tolerant has a major flaw: it takes the racist objection against others as an ethical objection that only needs to be restrained by adding certain reasons for acceptance. It thus turns an unacceptable prejudice into an ethical judgment. From this it follows that the reasons for objection must be reasonable in a minimal sense; they cannot be generally shareable, of course, but they must also not rest on irrational prejudice and hatred. The racist, therefore, can neither exemplify the virtue of tolerance nor should he be asked to be tolerant; what is necessary is that he overcome his racist beliefs. This shows that there are cases in which tolerance is not the solution to intolerance. Second, we encounter the paradox of moral tolerance, which arises in connection with the acceptance component. If both the reasons for objection and the reasons for acceptance are called moral, the paradox arises that it seems to be morally right or even morally required to tolerate what is morally wrong. The solution to this paradox, therefore, requires a distinction between various kinds of moral reasons, some of which must be reasons of a higher order than ground and limit toleration. Third, there is the paradox of drawing the limits, which concerns the rejection component. This paradox is inherent in the idea that toleration is a matter of reciprocity and that therefore those who are intolerant need not and cannot be tolerated, an idea we find in most of the classical texts on toleration. But even a brief look at those texts, and even more so at historical practice, shows that the slogan no toleration of the intolerant is not just vacuous but potentially dangerous, for the characterization of certain groups as intolerant is all too often itself a result of one-sidedness and intolerance. In a deconstructivist reading, this leads to a fatal conclusion for the concept of toleration: If toleration always implies a drawing of the limits against the intolerant and intolerable, and if every such drawing of a limit is itself a (more or less) intolerant, arbitrary act, toleration ends as soon it beginsas soon as it is defined by an arbitrary boundary between us and the intolerant and intolerable. This paradox can only be overcome if we distinguish between two notions of intolerance that the deconstructivist critique conflates: the intolerance of those who lie beyond the limits of toleration because they deny toleration as a norm in the first place and the lack of tolerance of those who do not want to tolerate a denial of the norm. Tolerance can only be a virtue if this distinction can be made, and it presupposes that the limits of toleration can be drawn in a non-arbitrary, justifiable way. The discussion so far implies that toleration is a normatively dependent concept. This means that by itself it cannot provide the substantive reasons for objection, acceptance, and rejection. It needs further, independent normative resources in order to have a certain substance, content, and limitsand in order to be regarded as something good at all. In itself, therefore, toleration is not a virtue or value; it can only be a value if backed by the right normative reasons. Any concrete use of the concept of toleration is always situated in particular contexts of normative and political conflict, especially in societies that are transforming towards increased religious, ethical and cultural pluralism even more so when societies are marked by an increased awareness of such pluralism, with some cultural groups raising new claims for recognition and others looking at their co-citizens with suspicion, despite having lived together for some time in the past. These social conflicts always involve group-based claims for recognition, both in the legal and in the social sphere. The contemporary debate has focused on questions of respecting particular religious practices and beliefs, ranging from certain manners of dress, including the burka, to certain demands to be free from blasphemy and religious insults. The general questions raised here include: What is special about religion as opposed to other cultural identities? When is equal respect called for and what exactly does it imply with respect to, for example, norms of gender equality? What role do past injustices play in weighing claims for recognition, and how much room can there be for autonomous forms of life in a deeply pluralistic society? To answer the question of which of these conceptions should be the guiding one for a given society, two aspects are most important. The first one requires an assessment of the conflicts that require and allowsfor toleration, given the history and character of the groups involved; and the second requires an adequate and convincing normative justification of toleration in a given social context. It is important to keep in mind that the concept of toleration itself does not provide such a justification; this has to come from other normative resources. And the list of such resources, speaking both historically and systematically, is long. The writer is former Head, Department of Medical Sociology, Institute of Epidemiology, Disease