Sri Lanka: Securitising minority alienation

The Easter Sunday carnage in which more than 250, mostly Christians, were killed is the most violent terrorist act in Sri Lanka since the end of the Eelam war in 2009. A terrorist attack on this scale involving the use of high-explosives in coordinated suicide missions on eight different targets by a relatively unknown entity, the National Towheed Jamath, reflects the state of complacency that has set in despite the receipt of prior intelligence. It is also indicative of the undue emphasis of the state security apparatus on the potential re-emergence of a LTTE type entity and the consequent focus on the northern province.

It is not that Sri Lanka was not aware of growing radicalism within the Muslim community, mostly generated by violence perpetrated against Muslims at the local level by groups such as the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS). Government officials have for long flagged concerns about Muslim youth who had gone to participate in the civil war in Syria. During the Rajapakse presidency, Muslims from Pakistan, India, Maldives, Bangladesh and some Arab countries who came to preach as part of Tabligh Jamaat were actually turned away at the airport due to the fear of radicalisation. There is, however, no history of animosity between Muslims and Christians that can place in context the Easter attacks. What does exist is a history of tension between the Sinhalese and Muslims since the end of the civil war. Many in the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress have even argued that Muslims are the new enemy of the Sinhalese. But an attack of this nature was not anticipated even by the Muslim community, although community leaders and some leaders of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress have been highlighting the trend of radicalisation due to the attacks orchestrated by the BBS, which many believe, had the blessings of the Rajapakse family.

Youths from well off families taking to suicide bombing is not a new phenomenon. In 2016, educated boys from affluent families caused mayhem in the Dhaka café attack. But Sri Lankan Muslim youth did not become radical or violent even after the LTTE had evicted their community and later bombed mosques in Kattankudy and Eravur killing nearly 300. Therefore, the question arises as to what prompted the latest suicide attacks and what has caused this turn of Sri Lankan Muslim youth towards radicalisation? Could this carnage have been prevented, as some argue including former President Mahinda Rajapakse and his brother former Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapakse (who is also the next presidential candidate of Sri Lanka Podujana Peremuna)? Or did the rift between President Sirisena and Prime Minister Wickremasinghe ensure that the attack went through without any decisive countermeasures being taken even after the receipt of intelligence?

Sri Lanka has a history of ethno-religious conflict. The first major conflict between Tamil speaking Muslims and Sinhalese occurred in 1915. After independence, Muslims were successfully co-opted by the Sinhala majority in order to wean them away from Tamils who began to demand a separate homeland and politically challenge Sinhala majoritarianism. After the end of the war with the LTTE in 2009, there was a discernible increase in violence against Muslims. Some argue that fringe Sinhala Buddhist extremists riding on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism searched for a new enemy and the Muslims fit their narrative. This should be seen in the context of the global portrayal of Muslims as extremists and radicals. The Buddhist-Muslim conflict in Myanmar and the attack on Buddhists in Ramu in Bangladesh fed the narrative of extremist groups like the BBS and Ravana Balaya. The drive against ‘halal’ certification, protest against Burqas, and attacks against Muslim business houses – all took place under the watchful eyes of the Rajapakse government. These included: the 2012 attack of Buddhist monks on a mosque in Dambullah which led to the relocation of the mosque; the attacks in Aluthgama in the South West coast of Sri Lanka in 2014; the attack on the Muslim owned fashion chain, the Fashion bug, in 2013; and, the March 2018 attack on Muslims in Kandy. The NTJ, which is the main suspect for the Easter Sunday attacks, came into the limelight only recently. Moulavi Zaharan, a teacher in Kattankudy Madrassah and also one of the suicide bombers in the attack at Shangri La hotel, was well known for his hate speeches. There are reports that NTJ broke away from its parent organisation Towheed Jamath in December 2018, when, in a series of incidents, Buddha statues were broken in Mawanella in Kandy district. The Muslim Council of Sri Lanka had earlier warned the authorities about the activities of these radicals. In 2014, The Peace Loving Moderate Muslims in Sri Lanka (PLMMSL) had issued a statement urging the government to ban the Towheed Jamaat saying that “this movement has fast become cancer within Muslim community in Sri Lanka, preaching and practicing religious intolerance.”

The writer is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India

 

Sri Lanka: Securitising minority alienation

The Easter Sunday carnage in which more than 250, mostly Christians, were killed is the most violent terrorist act in Sri Lanka since the end of the Eelam war in 2009. A terrorist attack on this scale involving the use of high-explosives in coordinated suicide missions on eight different targets by a relatively unknown entity, the National Towheed Jamath, reflects the state of complacency that has set in despite the receipt of prior intelligence. It is also indicative of the undue emphasis of the state security apparatus on the potential re-emergence of a LTTE type entity and the consequent focus on the northern province. It is not that Sri Lanka was not aware of growing radicalism within the Muslim community, mostly generated by violence perpetrated against Muslims at the local level by groups such as the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS). Government officials have for long flagged concerns about Muslim youth who had gone to participate in the civil war in Syria. During the Rajapakse presidency, Muslims from Pakistan, India, Maldives, Bangladesh and some Arab countries who came to preach as part of Tabligh Jamaat were actually turned away at the airport due to the fear of radicalisation. There is, however, no history of animosity between Muslims and Christians that can place in context the Easter attacks. What does exist is a history of tension between the Sinhalese and Muslims since the end of the civil war. Many in the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress have even argued that Muslims are the new enemy of the Sinhalese. But an attack of this nature was not anticipated even by the Muslim community, although community leaders and some leaders of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress have been highlighting the trend of radicalisation due to the attacks orchestrated by the BBS, which many believe, had the blessings of the Rajapakse family. Youths from well off families taking to suicide bombing is not a new phenomenon. In 2016, educated boys from affluent families caused mayhem in the Dhaka caf attack. But Sri Lankan Muslim youth did not become radical or violent even after the LTTE had evicted their community and later bombed mosques in Kattankudy and Eravur killing nearly 300. Therefore, the question arises as to what prompted the latest suicide attacks and what has caused this turn of Sri Lankan Muslim youth towards radicalisation? Could this carnage have been prevented, as some argue including former President Mahinda Rajapakse and his brother former Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapakse (who is also the next presidential candidate of Sri Lanka Podujana Peremuna)? Or did the rift between President Sirisena and Prime Minister Wickremasinghe ensure that the attack went through without any decisive countermeasures being taken even after the receipt of intelligence? Sri Lanka has a history of ethno-religious conflict. The first major conflict between Tamil speaking Muslims and Sinhalese occurred in 1915. After independence, Muslims were successfully co-opted by the Sinhala majority in order to wean them away from Tamils who began to demand a separate homeland and politically challenge Sinhala majoritarianism. After the end of the war with the LTTE in 2009, there was a discernible increase in violence against Muslims. Some argue that fringe Sinhala Buddhist extremists riding on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism searched for a new enemy and the Muslims fit their narrative. This should be seen in the context of the global portrayal of Muslims as extremists and radicals. The Buddhist-Muslim conflict in Myanmar and the attack on Buddhists in Ramu in Bangladesh fed the narrative of extremist groups like the BBS and Ravana Balaya. The drive against halal certification, protest against Burqas, and attacks against Muslim business houses all took place under the watchful eyes of the Rajapakse government. These included: the 2012 attack of Buddhist monks on a mosque in Dambullah which led to the relocation of the mosque; the attacks in Aluthgama in the South West coast of Sri Lanka in 2014; the attack on the Muslim owned fashion chain, the Fashion bug, in 2013; and, the March 2018 attack on Muslims in Kandy. The NTJ, which is the main suspect for the Easter Sunday attacks, came into the limelight only recently. Moulavi Zaharan, a teacher in Kattankudy Madrassah and also one of the suicide bombers in the attack at Shangri La hotel, was well known for his hate speeches. There are reports that NTJ broke away from its parent organisation Towheed Jamath in December 2018, when, in a series of incidents, Buddha statues were broken in Mawanella in Kandy district. The Muslim Council of Sri Lanka had earlier warned the authorities about the activities of these radicals. In 2014, The Peace Loving Moderate Muslims in Sri Lanka (PLMMSL) had issued a statement urging the government to ban the Towheed Jamaat saying that this movement has fast become cancer within Muslim community in Sri Lanka, preaching and practicing religious intolerance. The writer is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India